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1. Introduction 
1.1 Acknowledgements 
My grateful thanks for this thesis are due to Jan Kansmark at Mannheimer Swartling law firm 
who has shared his comprehensive experiences from project finance with me and been very 
supportive and encouraging throughout this journey and to Lisa Almén at EIB who patiently 
has replied to my numerous questions and with whom I have had supportive and inspiring 
discussions. I also want to thank Denis Petkovic (at Chadbourn and Park law firm), Philip 
Wood and Anthony Humphrey (at Allan Overy law firm) who provided me with 
accommodating consultation and materials. Finally, a special thanks to my tutor Rolf 
Dotevall, who jumped in at a late stage in this process, and made an efficient and encouraging 
work.  
1.2 Opening 
Public private partnership (PPP) is an alternative method for the financing of public 
infrastructure, based on the concept of financing public undertakings by private funds. The 
technique can be used in a number of different sectors such as transportation, energy, waste 
management, housing, education and healthcare. However, the focus for this essay is made to 
large-scale capital-intensive infrastructure projects such as, inter alia, motorways, railroads, 
bridges, water supply and energy facilities. PPP is commonly used all over Europe, 
particularly in England, and have recently grown exceedingly in the Nordic countries. Despite 
this European trend, the Swedish government has so far been hostile against making use of 
the PPP. However, given the positive outcome from the development that has taken place in 
the Nordic countries, Sweden is likely to follow the track. 
 
There are various forms of private public partnerships1, however, the basic concept is that a 
private company, solely established for the purpose of carrying out the project in question, 2 
takes the primary responsibility for the financing, designing, building and operating of a 
project facility, which is then transferred to the public sector.3 Using such a single purpose 
                                                
1 There are various forms and definitions of PPP depending on the magnitude of the private sector involvement. 
This essay predominantly deliberates BOT, a form of partnership considered to provide great advantages for the 
public sector and has therefore been supported by the United Nations and the European Union. For further 
guidance on different forms of PPP and categorisation see for instance Uncitral, United Nations, Legislative 
guide on privately financed infrastructure projects, New York, 2001, p. 5, § 19 
2 Such a project company is often referred to as a single purpose vehicle (SPV).  
3 European Investment Bank, The EIB’s role in public-private partnerships, Luxembourg, 2004, p. 15 
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vehicle (SPV) reduces the risks for the project sponsors thus making it possible for them to 
attain a “non-recourse financing”. This means that the lenders have no recourse against the 
project sponsors and therefore only may take recourse to the assets held by the project 
company for the repayment of their loans and for interest payments on such loans.4  
 
However, the value of the asset of the project company, at least at the beginning of the 
construction phase, is significantly limited and uncertain. There is often no established market 
for project assets such as a power plant or a motorway and the facilities are in general owned 
by the public sector, rather than the project company.5 The non-recourse financing technique 
in addition to the fact that there is no real asset to take security in thus exposes the creditors to 
considerable risk. The lenders are forced to almost solely rely on the future revenues of the 
project company. 6 Both the creditors and the equity holders therefore focus their attention on 
the prospective future cash flow of the project company.7 The most important objective for 
the creditors as well as for the equity holders is thus to keep the project running. The future 
revenues are generally provided by the public sector party, once the project is finalized. 
Hence, the key threat is a public sector party cancellation of the contract.  
 
In order to make these projects “bankable” the parties involved are forced to create innovative 
contractual solutions taking these foreseeable conditions into consideration. Apart from the 
traditional form of security, various forms of “quasi security” are often used. One of the most 
important features in this regard is direct agreements. Direct agreements are entered into 
between the project company, the banks financing a project and the parties to the project’s 
key underlying commercial contracts. The key contracts for this purpose would typically 
include the concession agreement, the main construction contract, any operation and 
maintenance agreement, any long-term supply contract and any long-term sales contracts.8 
The objective of a direct agreement is basically to enable the banks to “step into the shoes of 
the project company” if it defaults in its loan obligations. The agreements provide a right for 
the creditors to assume the project company’s rights and obligations under the contract for a 
specified period of time or allow the transfer of the contract to a separate company established 
by the banks for this purpose. If such an assumption is made, then the project contractors can 
                                                
4 Vinter, Project Finance, a legal guide, 1998, p. 111. 
5 Wood, Project Finance, 1995, p. 24. 
6 Merna & Cyrus, Financing and managing of infrastructure projects, 1998 p. 110.  
7 Merna & Cyrus, Financing and managing of infrastructure projects, p. 110.  
8 Wood, Project Finance, p. 32. 
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not terminate the defaulted contracts prematurely, their cancellation rights are to say “frozen”. 
Hence, direct agreements draw third parties into a projects finance agreement in that 
compulsory consent to accomplish an eventual assignment is obtained prior to such transfer is 
being considered. In doing so, the lenders can hinder third parties from exercising their 
contractual rights.  
 
However, direct agreements are met in accordance with English law, which is generally 
considered more ‘creditor friendly’ than the Germanic law tradition. Albeit the parties 
involved have agreed upon this solution, implications in the Swedish jurisdiction may render 
these agreements ineffective. The key threat to the efficiency of using direct agreements in 
Sweden is the potential bankruptcy of the project company. The bankruptcy itself does not 
necessarily create significant complications for the lenders, however the expected right of the 
bankruptcy’s estate to enter into the debtor’s contracts exposes the lender to higher risk. 
1.3 Purpose 
The purpose of this essay is to examine the efficiency of direct agreements used in private 
public partnerships and project financing in general, relating to large-scale infrastructure 
projects, in the light of Swedish law, particularly with regard to the project company’s 
bankruptcy and the principal rule of the estate’s right to enter into the debtor’s contracts. 
 
The two basic questions are, firstly whether the bankrupt estate is entitled to enter into the 
project company’s contracts, (or from a contractual perspective, whether the solvent party is 
entitled to cancel its contractual obligations) and secondly whether the right of the estate to 
accede to the project company’s contract is mandatory and hence an agreement opposing such 
right is void against the estate. The essay seeks to discuss these basic questions de lege lata as 
well as de lege ferenda in Sweden and to compare the legal situation in the Nordic countries 
and in England.  
 
Furthermore, the purpose of this essay is to suggest solutions of the problems evinced, 
principally to devise a law reform. 
1.4 Delimitation and background to the problem selected 
Since the objective of this essay is to examine the quandary of the bankrupt’s estate to enter 
into the debtor’s agreement, with regard to the particular nature of project finance, there is no 
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room for the various techniques and models to be presented in detail. The essay does not 
provide a comprehensive description of project finance, private public partnership or direct 
agreements. Apparently, essential components necessary for a proper understanding of the 
discussion here presented may be wanting. In order to provide a comprehensive conception, 
some elements of the particular nature of project finance are especially underlined and 
consequently, some repetition will transpire. 
 
The essay predominantly deliberates implications from the lender’s point of view. However 
the interest of the public party is of fundamental importance and hence presented as well. 
 
The set of question here examined have been selected against the background of a general 
analyse of the potential implications ensuing from the application of Swedish law on direct 
agreements, within different legal areas. However, a brief delimitation was firstly conducted 
and hence legal areas such as European community law and competitive law, communal-, 
environmental law and other particular individual Acts such as the Road Act etc, have not 
been deliberated at all. The legal areas subjected to review can be summarised to; contractual, 
property- (sakrättsligt) and company law perspectives. The analyse concludes that the 
application of the Swedish rules on the debtor’s estate right to accede to the project 
company’s contracts, are likely to cause the most severe implications for the efficiency of the 
lender’s rights approved in direct agreements. However, it is here suggested for further 
examination to be conducted within these legal areas. Besides the two matters of concerns; the 
various means for the lender’s to obtain control over the project in accordance with the 
Swedish law, and the effects of taking (and enforcing) security over the concession contract, 
are here recommended to be subjected to further scrutiny as well.  
1.5 Method 
The method used in order to achieve the outlined purposes is predominantly carried out by 
comparative literature studies. Swedish and Nordic legal doctrine is compared with English 
litterateur and case law. Besides, descriptive literature of project finance and private public 
partnership has been studied. Helpful guidance has been provided from a number interviews 
and general discussions conducted in England and with practitioners at Swedish law firms and 
companies.  
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The set of questions are predominantly examined from a functional perspective and the essay 
chiefly deliberates a contractual, bankruptcy and property law perspective. The essay have an 
analytic approach throughout the whole essay and seek to apply and examine de lege lata 
simultaneously, hence, the legal situation is presented in conjunction with the general 
discussion.  
1.5.1 Disposition 
The opening above has given an introductive presentation of private public partnerships and 
project finance and the particular risks induced in such financing techniques. The introduction 
results in the set of question that is to be examined, the efficiency of one of the particular 
security arrangements used in these financing techniques, so called direct agreements, under 
Swedish law. The rules of the bankrupt estate’s right to enter into the debtor’s agreement is 
considered as the key threat to the efficiency of such agreements and hence the quandary of 
this thesis. Before this is examined further, the first chapter provides a brief descriptive 
presentation of direct agreements and the purpose of using such contractual arrangements. 
 
The following chapter introduces and provide a background of the principal subject of the 
examination, hence bankruptcy and contracts. The theme examined is unregulated and the 
next chapter seeks to analyse and apply de lege lata with regard to the special nature of 
project finance and private public partnerships. Light is shed on the contemporary debate in 
progress all over Europe as well, having bearing on the development de lege ferenda. Next 
chapter accomplish a balancing of interest, taking de lege lata as well as de lege ferenda into 
account. This balancing of interest also has the function of predicate and arguing for de lege 
ferenda and hence comprises the basis for a law reform. The final chapter discuss the scope 
and legal technique for such law reform. The objective for a law proposal is to carve out 
exception from the right of the bankrupt estate to enter into the debtor’s agreement with 
regard to the particular nature of project finance. The essay concludes with a proposal of such 
law provision. 
 
2. Description and purpose of direct agreements 
The common view of security is that lenders take security over an asset in order to sell it if 
their loan is in default and to apply the proceeds against amounts outstanding under the loan.  
This is the "aggressive" nature of security - lenders are given rights entitling them to take a 
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valuable asset away from their borrower and to dispose of it for their benefit.  In order for this 
view to coincide with reality, the asset in question should be relatively freely marketable and 
have a fairly ascertainable value and the lenders should be free to exercise their rights without 
the need for third party consents. 
  
As indicated in the introduction, these factors are rarely present in a project financing and it 
may thus be questioned why a project financer should bother with security. Indeed, security 
serves a "defensive" as well as an offensive purpose - if a creditor has security over an asset, 
he ranks ahead of the general unsecured creditors and the ability of the unsecured creditors to 
interfere in the relationship between the debtor and the secured creditor is thereby limited. 
Besides, security may (depending on the legal systems concerned) entitle lenders to use an 
asset as opposed to merely selling it.9  
 
The idea behind the defensive purpose of security is that the unsecured creditors would have 
little to gain by pursuing potentially disruptive action against the debtor (such as seeking to 
have it wound up) and that, even if the unsecured creditors did take such action, the secured 
creditors would to a large extent be insulated from its effects.  The other purpose identified 
above (the "management" purpose) is really to give the lenders the option of taking over a 
project (and, if necessary, completing it) themselves.10 
 
As far as banks are concerned, a direct agreement can be said to perform both a defensive and 
an aggressive function.  It performs a defensive function in that it protects the banks against a 
precipitous termination of a project contract by the other contracting party and it performs an 
aggressive function in that it allows the banks to seize control of the project company's rights 
under the project contract.11  
 
It should also be noted that the typical direct agreement will refer to a novation of the project 
contract in two different types of circumstances. Firstly, the project contract can be novated to 
a work-out vehicle, really as a holding measure.  The second is that the project contract is to 
be novated to a trade buyer, someone who wishes to buy the project outright from the banks. 
Although use of the terms is by no means widespread, a person to whom the project contract 
                                                
9 Vinter, Project Finance 1998, p 149-150, Wood, project finance p. 30 and Wood, Comparative Law of 
Securities and Guarantees, p. 5-6 and 178-196. 
10 Vinter, Project Finance, 1998, p 149-150 and Wood, project finance p. 30. 
11 Wood, Project Finance, p 32. 
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is novated as a holding measure is sometimes referred to as an "additional obligor", while a 
person to whom the project contract is novated as part of a trade sale is sometimes referred to 
as a "substitute obligor".12  
 
It should be stressed as well that the step in rights are merely a right, hence the financier’s are 
not obliged to step in, besides the lender’s are generally approved to at any time step out 
again. What they will be anxious to avoid is that they are forced to inherit all of the project 
company's obligations under the contract in question, including its long-term obligations in 
relation to abandonment costs.  Of course, the contracting party may insist that this is the 
price for him agreeing to the banks having step-in rights.  The usual riposte to this is that even 
a temporary step-in must be of benefit to the contracting party because, without it, he will 
only be an unsecured creditor for any amounts he is owed and will have lost the ability to earn 
future amounts under the contract. Conversely, if the banks step in, not only will they (or an 
entity controlled by them) pay any amounts due and owing to the contracting party under the 
contract, they (or such entity) will also be liable for amounts becoming due during the period 
of the step-in.  Furthermore, if the banks did not step in, the project company would probably 
not have been able to meet those obligations (such as abandonment costs) in any event 
(because the assumption is that the banks will be stepping in when the project company is 
insolvent).13 
 
An example of the essential clauses for a direct agreement relating to a commercial contract is 
here presented:14 
"(A) The Agent [Bank] may, at any time, notify the Contracting Party that the New Entity 
shall be and be deemed to be a party to the Relevant Contract in place of the 
Borrower. 
(B) The Agent (or the New Entity) may at any time thereafter, by a further written notice 
to the Contracting Party, require the Contracting Party no longer to treat the New 
Entity as the party to the Relevant Contract and the New Entity shall be released from 
all future obligations under the Relevant Contract from the date specified in such 
notice (being no earlier than the date of such notice). 
                                                
12 Vinter, Project Finance, unpublished version from the 9 December 2005, chapter 8. 
13 Vinter, Project Finance, unpublished version from the 9 December 2005, chapter 8 section 7 (a) 
14 The example is provided from Vinter, Project Finance, 2005, chapter 8 section 7 (a) 
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(C) The Contracting Party agrees that, if it has the right to terminate the Relevant 
Contract and is intending to exercise such right, it will give the Agent at least [90] 
days' notice of its intention. 
(D) During the period referred to in paragraph (C) above, the Contracting Party shall 
continue to comply with all its obligations under the Relevant Contract and shall not 
terminate the same.  Once the New Entity has been substituted for the Borrower in 
accordance with the above, the Contracting Party shall afford the New Entity [a 
reasonable time] [[  ] days] in which to remedy any outstanding breach and shall 
allow the New Entity to transfer its rights under the Relevant Contract to any 
purchaser of the Project Assets." 
 
3. Introduction to bankruptcy and contracts 
3.1 Introduction to the problem  
Under Swedish law it is uncertain whether the estate's entitlement to demand performance of 
the debtor's agreements or, as it is usually called, the estate’s right to accede to the debtor's 
agreements, should be given status as an imperative right under the bankruptcy law. If so, 
agreements concerning rights of dissolution, cancellation or assignment by the solvent party 
would effectively be of essentially none effect against the bankruptcy estate. 
 
The debtor's right to accede to the debtor's contract will thus have serious implications with 
regard to project finance and PPP in several aspects. The starting point is that the debtor’s, the 
project company’s contracts comprises certain value for the debtor’s estate and the quandary 
is thus whether it should be included in the rest of the debtor’s estate. The contract that is to 
be examined here is the project contract that has been entered into between the project 
company and the client, the public party. As regards the public party, it is of fundamental 
importance to not be deprived of its contractual right to cancel according to mandatory 
provisions. From the lender's point of view it is predominantly a matter of being deprived 
their right to step in and opportunity to complete the project in question. The contractual right 
provided for in direct agreements is thus overtaken by the bankruptcy estate, which may 
compel the solvent party to performance.  
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Besides, the project contract and future claims are subjected to security in favour of the 
lenders that will be lost if the contracts are cancelled. How security is handled in the course of 
bankruptcy is not clear. Considering future claims, the value is deprived in a bankruptcy 
according to the “freeze principle”, however with regard to contracts in general and various 
forms of license and the factual concession contract it is not clear. This enquiry is essential as 
well, the possibility for the lenders to claim security over the concession contract and in case 
of bankruptcy enforce such right – hence not a right to the future revenues but a factual right 
to complete the project, could provide an efficient alternative and hence prevent the estate 
from entry. However, this enquiry is outside the scope of this essay nevertheless here 
recommended to be subjected to further scrutiny.  
 
Apparently, the efficiency of direct agreements is of fundamental importance with regard to 
project finance. If the debtor’s estate is entitled to enter into the debtor’s agreement the 
efficiency of direct agreements is hampered, hence the objective of this essay is to examine 
whether the debtor’s estate is entitled to such right.  
3.2 English law 
Direct agreements are negotiated in the light of English law where the debtor’s estate entry 
into the contracts is not a matter of concern. English security law have been weighted very 
heavily in favour for secured creditors. Not only did secured creditors rank ahead of 
unsecured creditors on insolvency, but secured creditors who held a qualifying floating charge 
could effectively control the manner in which their security was enforced. English law entitle 
the lenders to step in and enforce their security by means of taking over the business of the 
debtor and run it on behalf of them selves, without taking notice of other unsecured creditors. 
The relevant legislation allowed a secured lender who had the right to appoint an 
“administrative receiver” to effectively block the appointment of an administrator.15 The right 
to acquire the debtors business may thus not be possible without permissions and constant 
from third parties. Accordingly, direct agreements were intended in this regard, in order to 
make their extensive enforcement remedy effective.  
Step in rights does not necessarily need to be exercised as a means of, or in conjunction with 
the enforcement of security, however this is the basic principle behind the objective of direct 
                                                
15 See the old 22.9(3) and 29(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986. This point of law has been preserved, at appropriate 
places in Schedule B1 to the IA, in relation to the exceptions where an administrative receiver can still be 
appointed, see below. 
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agreements. Another question outside the scope of this essay, however of essential importance 
for the efficiency of direct agreements, is thus how the aggressive management or control 
purpose can be exercised in jurisdictions with no receivership remedy, such as in Sweden. 
The primarily purpose for the lenders is to run the debtor’s business and hence not to enforce 
their security, the way we are used to in Sweden. 
 
Besides to either stepping in directly themselves or trying to transfer the project to a work-out 
vehicle is subjected to inconvenience. A novation of the entire project contract may be of no 
use if it is not possible to transfer the project assets as well. Albeit it can be submitted that is 
not in contention whether security can be taken over all the asset of the project company, the 
transferring a business from one company to another may be more of a theoretical than a real 
right, because of the sheer volume of legal work that may be involved in such transfer.   
 
If, in the case of a jurisdiction with no receivership remedy, the banks can get comfortable 
with the possible liabilities that might result from an enforcement of any security they may 
have over the project company's shares and can take over control of a project in this manner. 
Such course of action would be fraught with potential direct liability for the banks. In a civil 
law jurisdiction limited enforcement remedies, it may thus be difficult to establish the basis of 
the banks' rights to bring about the novation of a project contract.  If the basis is simply a 
contractual agreement with the project company coupled with agency, this may be vulnerable 
if the project company is insolvent. The different means for the lender’s to step in and 
obtaining control over a project, that are likely to be in accordance with Swedish law, 
particularly in relation to the Company Act, remain uncertain and is thus here recommended 
to be examined further. Besides, these aspects have been subjected to extended negotiations 
when contracting PPP projects in the Nordic countries.16 
 
However, English security law underwent a dramatic change on 15th September 2003 when 
the new section 72A of the 1986 Insolvency Act (and related provisions in the Enterprise Act) 
came into force.17 From this date, the holder of a qualifying floating charge in respect of a 
company’s property may not appoint an administrative receiver of the company save in the 
                                                
16 Consultation with Agne Sandberg company lawyer at Skanska 
17 Section 72 (A)(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (inserted by s. 250(1) of the Enterprise Act, and Part 10 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002 
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case of certain exceptions.18 Three of the exceptions relate directly to project finance and 
public-private partnership projects and hence the appointment of an administrator may still be 
blocked for these particular cases. Apparently the lenders may still control the manner of the 
enforcement remedy and prevent the administrator from accede to the contracts.  
3.3 Background 
Swedish law do not contain any uniform rules on the effect of an insolvency proceeding on 
the debtor’s contracts. In fact, there is a dearth of general rules in this field. There are no 
generally worded legal rules concerning the procedure to be followed when the bankruptcy 
state wishes to fulfil, or actually does fulfil the debtor’s contracts. Swedish law contains only 
isolated regulations for certain special types of contracts. Mention may primary be made of 
rules for sale of goods and usufruct of real property.19  
 
The reason behind this fragmented regulation may be traced back to the joint Nordic revision 
of material bankruptcy law at the beginning of the 1970’s, where the question arose of the 
introduction of a general legal regulation of this field. Sweden however refrained from 
submitting proposals thereon, because general provisions were considered to not satisfy 
particular circumstances in different types of contracts. The transfer of operations to a 
liquidator was held to be a factor which, in certain however not in other contractual 
relationships may result in such erosion in the other party's conditions for the agreement that 
it is not deemed reasonable that the estate accede to the agreement.20  
 
Denmark and Norway, on the other hand, considered that the need for explanatory rules 
outweighed such objections. Thus, in contrast to Sweden, both these countries introduced 
overall rules on the subject. The Norwegian insolvency law incorporate rules both with regard 
to bankruptcy as well as corporation rehabilitation. The law underwent legislative changes in 
2000 in order to improve the coordination of these two proceedings. The basic principle 
according to Norwegian and Danish law is that insolvency on its own does not terminate 
                                                
18 ss.72B – 72GA of the IA 1986 
19 See, for example, section 63 of the Sale of Goods Act; Chapter 4, section 26, Chapter 8, section 17, Chapter 9, 
section 30, and Chapter 12, section 31 of the Land Code; section 47 of the Commercial Agents Act; section 27 of 
the Commercial Representatives Act; Chapter 2, section 27 and Chapter 4, section 7 of the Partnerships and 
Non-registered Partnerships Act; and sections 26 and 28 of the Insurance Contracts Act. 
20 See SOU 1970:75 p. 55 to the right, Håstad, Sakrätt avseende lös egendom, 6 uppl. 2000, p. 401 
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contracts, hence the debtor estate is entitled to accede to the debtor’s agreements save in the 
case of certain exceptions, where the nature of the legal relationship otherwise require. 21 
3.4 Need for reform 
The fragmented regulation in Sweden has thus resulted in uncertainty regarding the estate's 
right of accession both in regulated and unregulated contractual relationships.22 Besides, in 
1996 the company reorganisation implemented mandatory right for the debtor's estate to enter 
into the contracts, even with regard to partial entry, which is in violation of earlier case law.23 
The two proceedings fail to be in accordance with each other which have proved to reduce the 
efficiency of the law of company rehabilitations.  
 
The need for reform is firmly expressed in legal doctrine as well as in public documents and 
the subject has been highly debated during the latest years. Inconvenience with regard to 
insolvency law is however not solely a locally restricted dilemma thus recognised all over 
Europe. Lack of consistency and systematically give rise to problems establishing de lege 
lata. However the expressed need for reform predominantly refers to the interest of company 
reconstruction. Apart from the interest of all creditors, attention is now paid to the interest of 
safeguarding the debtors business and socio-economic cum labour market policy. 24  
 
This trend may have serious implications with regard to project finance and private public 
partnership. However in England, as demonstrated above, exceptions have been made for 
some certain cases, including project finance. Besides, in Norway exceptions from the basic 
principle of the estate’s right of entry have been carved out particularly with regard to private 
public partnership within the transport sector concerning construction of roads. 
 
However, so far the Swedish legislatives have not made any improvements or elucidated the 
matter. A public investigation was published in 2001suggesting a number of legislative 
reforms however the proposal has not yet given rise to concrete legislative changes.25  
Reasons for this delay is held to be because of a coming proposal of incorporating the 
                                                
21 Lov av 8. juni 1984 nr 58 om Gjeldsforhandling och konkurs (konkursloven), förarbete: NOU 1993:16 and Ot. 
Prp. Nr 26 (1998-99), Dekningsloven § 7:3 2 st 
22 Håstad, Sakrätt, p. 401, SOU 2001:70 
23 See for instance NJA 1989 s 206, the so called “Piccolo Mondo” case. 
24 See for instance Möller, Konkurs och Kontrakt, 1988 (Möller, 1988), Tuula, 2003 p. 130, Håstad, Sakrätt, 
SOU 2001:80 p. 24-25 etc. 
25 See for instance Håstad, Sakrätt p. 401- 402 and SOU 2001:80. 
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bankruptcy and the rehabilitations process into one coordinated insolvency proceeding. With 
regard to bankruptcy, the proposal was also held to be inadequate; the rules were described as 
solely sketches.26 Directives for further investigations of a coordinated insolvency proceeding 
is expected in March or April 2006.27  
3.5 Contractual or bankruptcy perspective 
The legal uncertainness is thus upheld by the fact that two diverse perspectives are presented 
in legal doctrine, the property and bankruptcy perspective as opposed to the contractual. 
Above all, as commentators representing both perspectives emphasis, it becomes a matter of 
balancing the to some extent conflicting interests that comes into play when one party to a 
contractual relationship is declared bankrupt and the bankruptcy estate wishes to continue the 
contract, i.e. the interest of the bankruptcy estate and its creditors as opposed to the interest of 
the solvent party.28  
 
According to the primer the maintenance of the debtor’s estate should be upheld with the view 
to obtain a financially advantageous liquidation, preferably via continuation of the business 
and selling it as a going concern. The interest of the bankruptcy estate and the other creditors 
is thus upheld as cancellation may deprive the debtor of a profitable contract producing a gain 
for the estate and that also may be essential for a rescuing of the debtor via rehabilitation 
proceeding. The solvent party should not be entitled to use the insolvency as a mean to cancel 
onerous contracts or use the threat of cancellation in order to force the debtor’s estate to 
performance. Hence, the creditors must be protected from the debtor’s counterparties wanting 
to abandon from onerous contracts since this would give them an unjustified preference in the 
bankruptcy.29 
 
According to the latter point of view, thus primary taking the interest of the solvent party into 
consideration, the debtor’s estate should not in any case be entitled to be in a better position 
than the debtor were previous to the bankruptcy. Where the debtor has breached the contract 
and the breach entitles the solvent party to cancel, the creditor may cancel as against the 
debtor’s estate as well, even though security or claim is provided. From this contractual 
                                                
26 SOU 2001:80 p. 217. 
27 Uppgift från justitiedepartementet den 30 januari 2006 av Mina Lunqvist. 
28 See for instance Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, 3 uppl, Allmänna ämnen, tredje upplagan, 1996, p. 81 ff, 
Tuula, p. 21 ff, Möller, p. 39 ff. 
29 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2 p. 83, Tuula, p. 22, Wood, Project Finance, p. 66. 
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perspective the basic question is thus if the solvent party may cancel an agreement in the 
course of the counterparty’s bankruptcy.30  
 
The basic distinction ensuing from these two points of departures is thus if the rules are to be 
considered as mandatory or discretionary. Apparently, the bankruptcy perspective implies the 
rules to be considered as an imperative right under the bankruptcy law, hence an agreement 
concerning the right of cancellation by the solvent party is of non effect against the 
bankruptcy state. The contractual perspective, on the other hand, is of discretionary character 
and hence entitles the solvent party to contract terms beyond the scope of the Sale of Goods 
Act in the course of bankruptcy.31 
 
4. Analyse with regard to the project contract 
4.1 Point of departure  
The contracts that may be subjected to direct agreements varies and thus comprises a whole 
range of agreements such as concession, construction and general sale agreements. However, 
as indicated above, the agreement entered into between the public party and the project 
company is the most important contract due to its implied ability to secure future revenues 
and the prescribed right to build the project in question. Besides, the most fundamental 
security for the financiers is taken over this particular contract (i.e its future revenues). Hence, 
the estate’s right to entry is predominantly examined with regard to this contractual 
relationship however knowledge and understanding of the entire context is essential. Besides 
emphasis is made to the analysis of applicable law with regard to project finance, hence the 
conflicting views expressed in legal doctrine are chiefly presented in conjunction with the 
general analysis. 
 
Since private public partnership so far is not in use in Sweden, there is no regulation, nor case 
law nor legal doctrine on the matter. The agreement entered into between the public party and 
the project company thus comprises an unregulated contractual relationship. It is 
acknowledged in legal doctrine that uncertainty often prevails regarding the estate’s right of 
accession in unregulated cases. Despite implied inconveniences, this legal uncertainty brings 
                                                
30 Håstad, Sakrätt. p. 402. 
31 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2 p. 89. 
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about room for argumentation with regard to project agreements. Both the extent to which a 
bankrupt‘s estate has a right of accession in unregulated cases as well as whether the estate’s 
right of accession is mandatory when such occur is subjected to uncertainty.32 These two 
uncertain factors are thus taken as point of departure in the analysis of the legal situation with 
regard to project agreement in PPP. 
 
Besides, these two factors have bearing on the efficiency of the lender’s right to step in, hence 
the quandary may be examined from two different perspectives. Firstly, the lenders are free to 
step into the contract provided that the solvent party is entitled to cancel in course of 
bankruptcy. (According to the terms in the direct agreement, the solvent party is prevented 
from cancelling, thus in practice the contract is novated from the solvent public party to the 
“additional –“or the “substitute obligor” without the contract being cancelled, however such 
perception provides a theoretical means to avoid the right of the estate to enter into the 
debtors agreements.) Secondly, the lenders may hypothetically whish to exercise the rights 
provided for in direct agreements, directly in the bankruptcy against the estate.  
 
The two basic questions to be examined is thus firstly whether de lege lata entitles the project 
company’s bankruptcy estate to enter into the project agreement and compel the public 
counterparty to performance (and prevent the lenders from exercising their step in rights), or 
expressed from a contractual perspective, whether the solvent public party is entitled to 
cancel. Secondly, wheatear an agreement interfering with the right of the debtor’s estate, such 
as an assignment of the contract to the lenders, as prescribed in direct agreements, is effective 
against the estate.  
 
As for unregulated cases in general, analogies to particular set of laws, case law and general 
contractual, bankruptcy and property law principles must be made.33 Appropriate guidance 
may be given from general principles on performance of non-monetary obligations. Besides, 
project finance has essential features in common with construction agreements, which 
conversely have been subjected to extensive debate in legal doctrine. Particular attention is 
paid to the legislative reform conducted in Norway as well.  
                                                
32 See for instance SOU 2001:80 p. 24, 25. 
33 Tuula, p. 23-24, SOU 2001:80 s. 81, Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, p. 92. 
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4.2 Analogy to individual acts 
The individual acts under Swedish law that contain provisions relating to the contractual 
relationship affected in case of bankruptcy prescribe different models on how bankruptcy 
affects the debtor’s contract. The starting point must be taken in the Swedish Sale of Goods 
Act (SGA). Subsequent to legislative changes in 1990, the current wording of paragraph 63 
entitles both the buyer and the seller’s bankruptcy estate to enter into the debtor's contract.34 
This provision lays down the basic principle of the right of the estate to accede to the debtor’s 
agreement. The same principle applies with regard to the tenant’s bankruptcy in case of rental 
of non-residential property. Provided that security is offered, the bankruptcy estate is thus 
given a mandatory right to prevent the solvent party from cancel.35 
 
Some individual acts on the other hand prescribe that the contracts in question cease to endure 
immediately as a consequence of the bankruptcy, such as commission contracts and some 
association contracts.36 The same principle applies with regard to insurance agreements 
however subsequent to certain delay.37 On the contrary, according to some provisions the 
solvent party is given an unconditional right to cancel in the course of the other party’s 
bankruptcy.38 
 
The first question is thus whether analogy may be made directly to an individual act 
prescribing right for the solvent party to cancel. Apparently, the provisions provided in 
legislative acts are sometimes contradictory without the contradictions being susceptible to 
any reasonable explanation.39 It is thus hard to make certain analogies to particular sets of 
laws. No individual act appears to be suitable for direct analogy. The analogy that appears to 
prevail in doctrine with regard to most unregulated contractual relationship is the basic 
principle ensuing from the 63 § Sale of Goods Act. Besides, the Sale of Goods Act is held to 
be an expression of general contractual principles and thus convenient as analogy to other 
types of contracts.40 Despite the preference given in doctrine in favour of the estate right to 
accede to the debtor’s contracts the contractual interest of the solvent party appears to have 
                                                
34 63 § 1 st. SGA. 
35 See chapter 12 section 31 Land Code, see as well, 8:17, 9:30, 4:26. 
36 See section 47 of the Commercial Agents Act, section 27 of the Commercial Representatives Act 
37 sections 26 and 28 of the Insurance Contracts Act. 
38 See for instance chapter 9, section 30 Land Code and Chapter 2, section 27 and chapter 4, section 7 of the 
Partnership and Non-registrated partnership Act. (SOU 2001:80, p. 85). 
39 See as well SOU 2001:80 p.  
40 See for instance Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, p. 84. 
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strong impact on the development in case law (see NJA 1989 p. 206 see as well 2001 p. 99). 
Reform is held not to be carried out without legislation (see NJA 1999 p. 617).41 
 
There are not many unregulated contractual relationships that in doctrine is definitely held to 
deviate from the general principle, solely in analogy with particular individual acts. Where 
exceptions are held to be likely, other forms of legal techniques are generally applied. 
However, for some particular cases such direct analogy has been made, mention may primary 
be made to financial leasing. Financial leasing is in legal doctrine held to represent a unique 
type of contract and consequently the rules of the Sale of the Goods Act are not directly 
applicable. Instead analogies are held to be sought in the rules for sale of goods and for rental 
property.42 It is held that since the estate, according to the provisions for these two contractual 
relationships, has a right to accede to debtor’s contract, the same principle should apply with 
regard to financial leasing as well. Appreciably certain interests in conjunction with financial 
leasing are besides taken into consideration.43 
4.3 The basic principle 
Apparently, Swedish law opens up for making analogies to other sets of law than the Sale of 
the Goods Act. It is likely to argue that construction contracts comprises an unique type of 
contractual relationship and hence in analogy with commission contracts for instance, bring 
about exception from the basic principle and provide the solvent counterparty with an 
unconditional right to cancel. However it is doubtful if such argumentation prove successful. 
Hellner emphasis that with regard to long-term agreements analogies may be made to §§62, 
63 of Sale of Goods Act, § 47 Commission law and to general principle with regard to 
cancellation due to essential ground, however points out that analogy to 63 § Sale of Goods 
Act prove in dubio to be the most convenient.44 
 
The principal rule acknowledge in doctrine, that most likely is to apply with regard to 
construction contracts in project finance as well, is thus to make analogy with the Sale Goods 
Acts and hence stating that the debtor’s estate is entitled to accede to the contracts. Unlike the 
provision under Norwegian law and in several other jurisdictions, exceptions may not be 
                                                
41 SOU 2001:80, p. 25. 
42 Möller, 1988, p. 442 ff. 
43 SOU 2001:80 p. 87, see as well Tuula, p. 87 ff, Möller, Civilrätten vid financiell leasing, 1996, p. 255 and 266 
f and SOU 1994:120. 
44 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, p. 92, See as well Hellner, Inslvensrättsligt forum 1990, p. 213. 
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made solely due to the nature of the contractual relationship. However, it is acknowledged 
under Swedish law that exceptions may be made in analogy with the contractual principle of 
anticipatory breach ensuing from 62 § Sale of Goods Act.45 The extent to which this provision 
is applicable is thus in contention.46 
4.4 Anticipatory non-performance 
Due to the considerably inconvenience that the wording of section 63 of the Sale of Goods 
Act (SGA) may cause the buyer in the course of the seller’s bankruptcy, exceptions have been 
acknowledged in the preparatory works. The explanatory works emphasis that the general 
contractual principle of anticipatory breach ensuing from the provisions under section 62 of 
the Sale of the Goods Act shall apply in course of bankruptcy as well.47 Where the 
performance is dependent on particular circumstances from the seller himself, the solvent 
party may cancel, such as a personal contracts requiring personal skill. It is thus held that the 
solvent party should be entitled to cancel in cases where there will be a fundamental breach of 
contract because the estate lack preconditions to perform contractually.48  
 
The wording of section 62 of SGA correspond to the CISG article 72, thus giving the solvent 
party a noticeably right to cancel in case of anticipated breach. General requirements 
acknowledged with regard to anticipatory breach are that it should be clear that there will be a 
non-performance, a suspicion, even a well-founded one is not sufficient. Furthermore, it is 
necessary for the non-performance to be fundamental.49 
 
Hellner emphasis that these preconditions in general should be satisfied in the course of 
bankruptcy thus arguing that the bankruptcy per se constitute an anticipatory breach. 
However, he stress that it is doubtful wheatear the advantages for the bankrupt’s estate, 
ensuing from section 63 of SGA, may be eliminated by invoking its section 62. Hellner 
emphasis that section 63 of SGA comprises a restriction compared to the far-reaching right in 
favour of the solvent party prescribed in section 62 of SGA.50 The requirement of section 63 
of SGA is “certain reasons” as opposed to the general right implied in section 62, besides, the 
                                                
45 SOU 2001:80 p. 86. 
46 See for instance Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt, II:2, p. 90-91, and below 
47 Prop 1988/89:76 p. 182 ff. 
48 Prop 1988/89:76 p. 183. 
49 See for instance Ramberg, Köplagen, p. 598, Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, p. 87, Unidroit Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts, Article 7.3.4 with comments, p. 226. 
50 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2p. 90, 91. 
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latter require extended timeframe (“immediately or without delay” (“genast”) according to 
section 62 as opposed to “without unreasonable delay” (“utan oskäligt uppehåll”)). Hellner 
presumes the meaning of the proposition to be that the solvent party may cancel provided that 
other reasons than the insolvency is invoked to anticipate the breach. The law provisions do 
not distinguish between different forms of anticipated breaches.51  
4.5 Deviations from the basic principle 
It appears that the basis behind the individual sets of laws deviating from the basic principle 
of the estate’s right to accede to the contracts and exceptions acknowledge in analogy with 
anticipatory breach correspond. The individual acts that prescribe exceptions from the general 
principle have some features in common and hence may give some guidance on likely 
exceptions. Möller emphasis that the basis for these rules distinguishes from the general 
considerations made in the Goods of the Sale Act and the Land Code. An essential element in 
this regard is held to be that the contractual relationships typically are of a personal nature, 
relying on trust and confidence. Möller argues that the counterparty’s insolvency for these 
particular contractual relationships indicate that an essential precondition for the due 
performance is wanting.52 There are very few unregulated contractual relationships that in 
doctrine, with certainty, are held to be exceptions, mention may primary be made to pure 
credit agreements. However vast degree of uncertainty is held to subsist with regard to 
construction contracts and patent licence contracts.53 
 
Apparently, deviation from the basic principle may not be acknowledged solely due to the 
insolvency or bankruptcy. However exceptions appear to be likely where the contract is of 
personal nature. 
4.6 Construction contracts and non-monetary performance 
Albeit the particular contractual relationships to a project company have not been deliberated 
in legal doctrine such relationships have a lot in common with complex sale agreements and 
construction contract that conversely have been subjected to extended debate, in Sweden as 
well as in the Nordic countries and in Germany. The reason behind the extensive literature is 
connected to the generally recognised problem where a non-monetary obligation is to be 
performed by a third party. Hence, in essence the project company is to perform a non-
                                                
51 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt, II:2. p. 90, 91. 
52 Möller, Insolvensrättsligt forum, 22-23 januari, 1990, p. 202. 
53 SOU 2001:80 p. 208. 
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monetary obligation which brings about the quandary of the treatment of the seller’s and the 
entrepreneur’s contractual non-monetary obligations in case of their bankruptcy. The matter is 
of paramount concern particularly due to the frequency of standard contracts and agreements 
prescribing an unconditional right for the solvent party to cancel in course of bankruptcy. 
 
Sweden has no general laws on construction contracts. The standard contract “Allmänna 
bestämmelser för byggnads-, anläggnings och instatllationsentreprenader” (General 
regulations for Building, Construction and Installation Contractors) (AB 92) instead holds 
pride of place. Following the legislative reform in the Sale of Goods Act, AB 72 underwent 
similar changes in 1992. In contrast to the wording of the 1972 version and in accordance 
with the Sale of Goods Act, the clauses give both the client’s (the future proprietor) as well as 
the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy estate right to enter into the contracts provided that security is 
offered.  
 
The contemporary legal situation with regard to the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy is fluid, 
however, most commentators suggest in analogy with the Sale Goods Act and in accordance 
with the standard construction agreement, AB 92, that the entrepreneur’s estate is entitled to 
accede to the debtor’s contract. This is considered as pertinent due to the fact that the SGA 
entitles the bankruptcy estate to enter albeit the performance in question concerns complex 
construction agreements. However, the legal uncertainness is accented.54 Besides, it is held 
that the general principle of anticipated breach ensuing from 62 § of the Sale of the Goods Act 
is applicable with regard to construction contract and the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy as well.55 
Consideration to certain aspects in individual cases may thus be satisfied within the scope of 
anticipated breach.  
 
Preparatory works and contemporary legal literature make frequently references to the thesis 
of Möller, albeit legislatives reforms have been made subsequent to his work. 56 Möller base 
his thesis on Nordic and German legal literature to a large extent. Notwithstanding that 
Swedish law do not lay down general rules on the matter, the legal situation appears to 
correspond to the Nordic rules to a significant extent. The key argument invoked in favour of 
the solvent party to cancel with regard to construction contracts, is that the attribute of the 
                                                
54 See i.e SOU 2001:80, p. 86, 87. 
55 See for instance SOU 2001:80, p. 87 and p. 209, Håstad, Sakrätt, p. 405. 
56 SOU 2001:80, p. 222. 
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entrepreneur often is held to be of personal nature. Particular concern is also held to be due to 
the likely risk of key employers to leave in course of the debtor’s bankruptcy. Håstad stress 
that the debtor’s estate may have problems keeping employers and hence not be able to 
complete the construction work in time and without defaults.  
 
In Norway, the same principle as expressed in AB 92 has prevailed, hence, the entrepreneur’s 
bankrupt’s estate is entitled to enter into the contract provided that the estate can show that it 
has sufficient financial and cognitive resources to complete the work contractually.57 
However, the general exception prescribed in Norwegian law acknowledges the insolvency to 
be invoked as a mean to cancel where the contractual relationship is of certain nature. In 
Germany on the other hand, it was established in case law in 1985 that the predominantly 
standard contract’s right of cancellation in the event of the building contractor’s bankruptcy is 
effective against the latter’s bankruptcy estate. This is justified on the ground that the 
entrepreneur’s personal attributes are so important that the estate may not be allowed to 
complete the works in accordance with contracted terms. Moreover, the mutual trust on which 
the contractual relationship is based is impaired by the bankruptcy and a liquidated business is 
said to be incapable of fully assuming the entrepreneur’s guarantee responsibility for 
defects.58 
4.7 Contract of personal nature 
Guidance on the “traditional” meaning of personal attribute may be given from international 
sources such as Unidroit Principles and is here expressed to be related to the obligor’s specific 
qualifications (see the comments on Article 9.2.6).59 Performance of an exclusive personal 
character is in article 7.2.2 held to be when it is not delegable and requires individual skill of 
an artistic or scientific nature or if it involves a confidential and personal relationship.60 
 
However, such traditional arguments referring to personal attribute of the debtor, is unlikely 
to apply concerning the particular circumstances at stake in private public partnership.  
None of these preconditions is pertinent with regard to the project company. Essential features 
distinguishing private public partnership from the arguments invoked in relation to 
                                                
57 NOU 1972:20 p. 314, Ot prp nr 50 (1980-81) p. 184, see as well Möller 1988, p. 262, ref to Braekhus p. 174 
58 BGH 26.9.1985 (ZIP 85.1509) see Möller 1988, p. 264 
59 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Article 9.2.6, comment p. 298. 
60 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Article 7.2.2 Performance of non-monetary 
obligation, Comment 1, p. 210. 
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construction contracts is that the project company in general solely comprises an empty “shell 
company” without own employers etc. Hence, it is not the project company who carry out the 
work, this is done by subcontracting parties. Arguments that key employers tend to leave in 
the course of bankruptcy may be applicable, however, in this regard referring to the workers 
employed by the subcontracting parties. 
 
Whether the performance of the project company could be characterised as personal have 
been subjected to scrutiny in the explanatory work to the legislative changes brought about in 
the Norwegian Road Act, (“Veglova”), where exceptions from the principal rule have been 
carved out in relation to public private partnership projects for (the construction and 
maintenance) of public roads. However, the idea was here rejected. It is first held that there 
are many companies competing in order to obtain the concession and thus competent to 
perform the contract. The most important objection in this regard is however held to be the 
factual step in rights themselves. In accordance with the international principles referred to 
above, an essential element in determining personal nature is whether the contract is 
transferable.61 Step in rights thus proves that the contract is transferable. Besides, it is 
submitted in the Norwegian explanatory work, that since the project company does not carry 
out the project work on its own, the bankruptcy estate may employ exactly the same 
subcontractors as the project company. 62 
 
However, it must be invoked that the solvent party does not entitle the project company a 
general right to assign the contract, on the contrary, this right is solely held in favour of the 
lenders and provided that certain requirements are met. Indeed, the project agreement contains 
clauses preventing the project company from assigning the contract. The transfer is thus 
surrounded by control and particular conditions that the bankruptcy estate may not be able to 
fulfil.  
4.8 Economical aspects and long-term contracts  
However, there are several other aspects beyond personal skills that may render the 
contractual relationship personal. Notwithstanding the project company does not perform the 
contracted work itself, the public party base the decision of who to grant the concession on a 
number of factors. Möller claim that the entrepreneur’s skill is important in this regard, 
                                                
61 Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts, Article 7.2.2. 
62 Vegdirektoratet, 20. desember 2005 UTKAST TIL ODELSTINGSPROPOSISJON: Om lov om endringer i 
veglova, (”Vedlegg 201205”) p. 3. 
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however, emphasis that his economical preconditions and the duration of the work are of 
significance as well.63 The project company’s economical stability may thus be considered as 
a personal attribute of essential importance for the public party’s decision, a factor that 
increases with the duration and complexity of the project.  
 
It appears that anticipatory breach may be invoked on a different ground than the “traditional” 
meaning of personal nature, rather in accordance with the reasoning of Möller, when he 
elucidates the basis behind the individual acts that deviates from the basic principle.64 Hence, 
the debtor’s insolvency may for certain contractual relationships denote that an essential 
precondition for the due performance is wanting.65 It must thus be examined whether the 
solvency of the project company can be said to comprise an essential precondition for the due 
performance, against the background of the particular nature of project finance and public 
private partnership.  
 
It is clear that the bankrupt estate does not have the equivalent economical stability as the 
project company, and is unlikely to prove adequate assurance of human resources due to the 
extended duration and costly project. The estate is generally not skilled to complete the work 
on its own and hence assignment to third parties is common or even compulsory. Assignment 
requires consents from the solvent parties and is besides according to contracted terms not 
permitted. Furthermore, where the contracted warranties go beyond the predicted duration of 
the bankruptcy, which is almost certainly the case for such long-lasting contractual 
relationship as in project finance, assignment is definitely obligatory. Albeit the enquiry of 
consent may be considered as a practicality, and hence not preventing the estate from entry, it 
may in this regard have significant legal implications. Apparently, if assignment is 
compulsory however not permitted the estate can not guarantee due performance. Möller 
support this “rule of evidence”: 
 
”Om boet beräknas ha avvecklats innan entreprenaden färdigställts, kan inte boet visa att de 
kommer att klara av att fullgöra entreprenörens förpliktelser enligt avtalet. Beställaren skulle 
då kunna häva redan på den grunden.”66 
 
                                                
63 Möller, 1988, p. 292. 
64 See above, Möller, Insolvensrättsligt forum, 22-23 januari, 1990, p. 202. 
65 Möller, Insolvensrättsligt forum, 22-23 januari, 1990, p. 202. 
66 Möller, 1988, p. 298 
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Apparently, provided that the contracted warranties goes beyond the predicted duration of the 
bankruptcy, the estate can not guarantee due performance. Apart from necessary consents, 
legal permissions are generally required as well, whish the bankrupt’s estate is unlikely to 
obtain since it is not skilled and not suitable to complete and operate the project. It is thus 
likely that the Swedish legal situation acknowledge further aspects than prescribed in the 
Norwegian explanatory work, to be taken into account when determining personal attribute.  
4.9 Analogy to Norwegian law 
Albeit the legal appraisal in the explanatory work to the new wording of the Norwegian Road 
Act, hasty rejects the idea of the contractual relationship to be of personal nature, it is here 
held that consideration to economical aspects and the duration of the contract, are more likely 
to be acknowledged on another basis, ensuing from the general exception prescribed in the 
Bankruptcy Act.67  
 
In order to understand the wording of the Norwegian explanatory work to the Road Act, it s 
necessary examine the general applicable Norwegian Bankruptcy Act further. The general 
principle in Norway, as presented above, is that insolvency on its own does not terminate 
contracts.68 The solvent party is however entitled to invoke the insolvency as ground for 
cancellation, if the contractual relationship is of certain nature.69 Two examples are provided 
in the explanatory work to the Bankruptcy Act in this regard. Firstly, it is held that “it may for 
certain types of contracts be in the nature of the contract that the insolvency comprises a 
relevant wanting condition”. Secondly it is held that exceptions from the right of accession 
may be approved where the contract is of personal nature, hence, where the debtor is entitled 
to prevent other parties from performance it is held to be reasonable that the debtor’s estate is 
to be prevented as well.70 
 
Apparently, it is rather clear that performance of the project company can not be considered 
as personal under Norwegian law due to the lender’s right to step in. Since the lenders are 
entitled to step in and hence other parties are not prevented from performance, neither should 
                                                
67 Lov av 8. juni 1984 nr 58 om Gjeldsforhandling och konkurs (konkursloven), förarbete: NOU 1993:16 and Ot. 
Prp. Nr 26 (1998-99). 
68 Lov av 8. juni 1984 nr 58 om Gjeldsforhandling och konkurs (konkursloven), förarbete: NOU 1993:16 and Ot. 
Prp. Nr 26 (1998-99). 
69 Dekningsloven § 7:3 2 st. 
70 NOU 1972 :20 p. 309 ff, Vedlegg 20120, p 4. 
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the debtor’s estate be deprived of its right to compel performance. Whether assignment is 
likely to occur is thus a determent condition.  
 
On the other hand, the secondly example provided in the explanatory work, hence whether the 
particular nature of the project agreement may render the insolvency of the project company 
to an essential wanting condition, appears more appropriate. Consequently, the insolvency of 
the project company may per se constitute an anticipated breach on the basis that an essential 
precondition for due performance is missing. 
 
However, it is uncertain whether Swedish law acknowledge such argumentation to be invoked 
in order to constitute anticipatory breach. It is articulated in Swedish preparatory work that the 
solvent party can not prevent the estate from entry solely due to the fact that the debtor’s 
person is significant for the due performance, as in Norway and Denmark.71 The Swedish 
proposition does not comment upon the economical attribute of the debtor or contracts of 
long-term duration. It is however held that the solvent party is not required to accept 
performance from the debtor’s estate in all circumstances. In general terms, it is held that the 
debtor’s estate should not be entitled to compel performance where this implies disadvantages 
for the solvent counterparty. However, examples provided in this regard, as indicated above, 
are where the seller’s personal attributes are of certain importance such as personal 
knowledge and skill. It is held that the solvent party should be entitled to invoke anticipatory 
breach according to the 62 section in SGA “in such and similar cases”.72 
 
Nevertheless, exceptions are to be acknowledged to the same extent as in Norway, in analogy 
with the Norwegian law provision, the outcome with regard project finance is far from clear. 
Whether exceptions for private public partnership should be approved, according to the 
second example prescribed in the Norwegian proposition of the Bankruptcy Act, have been 
subjected to scrutiny in the explanatory work to the new wording of the Road Act. However 
given the fact that a law reform has been implemented the outcome of the appraisal is rather 
predictable. 
                                                
71 SOU 2001:80, p. 86. 
72 Prop 1988/89:76, p. 182 ff. 
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4.9.1 The reason behind the Norwegian legislative reform 
The wording in the law proposal to the legislative reform in “veglova” somewhat supports the 
idea that the insolvency of the project company may be regarded as an essential missing 
precondition due to the extended and durable obligation, however concludes that uncertainty 
prevails. 
 
References are made to the general preparatory work that lay down the basic principle of the 
estate’s right to enter. These papers comment upon long-term contracts and contracts that are 
subjected to extended future payments (from the estate) and it is held that considering the 
estate’s duty to provide security it should be possible to entitle the estate a restricted right to 
entry into such contracts as well. “Med de regler om boets plikt til å stille sikkerhet og boets 
oppsigelsesadgang som er oppstillet i §§ 7-5 og 7-6, skulle det etter utkastet være mulig å gi 
boet en rasjonelt begrenset rett til å tre inn også i kontrakter av disse typer”. 73 
 
This wording is interpreted in doctrine not to principally prevent the estate from entry in such 
cases. It is held that the public counterparty is not entitled to prevent the estate from entry 
solely on the basis of the long-term and extended nature of the project contract referring to the 
exception “the art of the contract” (in dekningsloven § 7-3, 2 st.) This is considered as 
reasonable due to the legal obligation for the estate to provide security.74 
 
However, it is recognised in general legal theory that the solvent party should be entitled an 
extensive right to cancel long-term contracts in the course of bankruptcy. The law proposal (in 
“veglova”) refers to Sandberg who emphasise, in accordance with the wording of Möller 
referred to above, that the solvent party should be entitled to cancel where the contracted 
warranties goes beyond the predicted duration of the bankruptcy estate.75 The same reasoning 
appears to prevail in Danish legal theory.76 However the law proposal accents that it is not 
clear how these aspects, hence the extended right to cancel due to long-term contractual 
obligations, should be treated with regard to the duty to provide security. Since the estate is 
obliged to provide security if he decides to enter into the debtor’s contract, his right of entry is 
likely to be considered as reasonable.  
 
                                                
73 NOU 1972:20 p. 313, see as well Mads H. Andenaes, Konkurs, 1999, 2 upp. p. 156. 
74 Vedlegg 201205, p. 4. 
75 Vedlegg 201205, p. 4,  ref to Tore Sandvik, Laerbok i materiell konkursret, 1999, p. 593-594. 
76 Ref to Niels Orgaard, Konkursret, 1999, 7 uppl, p. 59. 
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The law proposal concludes that uncertainty prevails and hence that it can not be excluded 
that the estate is considered to have right to enter into the project agreement in private public 
partnerships.77 
4.10 Implication of the right to provide security 
However, the same “vacant space” appears to prevail in Swedish legal theory both with regard 
to the general principle of anticipatory breach prescribed in section 62 SGA and with regard 
to the wording of section 63 SGA that lays down the principle of the estate’s right to accede 
to the debtor’s contracts, however provided that security is offered.  
 
According to section 62 SGA, the party threatened by cancellation may avert such remedy if 
appropriate security is offered. Apparently, the solvent party is deprived its right to cancel 
ensuing from the anticipated breach, in accordance with section 62 (2 st), if the debtor 
provides security.78 It is unclear under Swedish provisions to what extent security may 
prevent the solvent party from cancelling and how far-reaching security the estate is required 
to provide.  
 
Explanatory work does not clarify how the two sections relate to each other, if the right to 
provide security may render the solvent party’s cancellation right according to section 62 of 
SGA ineffective. It is solely held that where performance is dependent on particular 
circumstances from the seller himself, the solvent party is entitled to invoke the principle of 
anticipated breach in accordance with section 62 SGA and prevent the estate from entry.79 
Neither do general principles ensuing from international sources give any comprehensive 
guidance, CISG do not deal with property rights.80 
 
Håstad emphasis that following the legislative changes in SGA and in AB 92, it is possible 
that the debtor’s estate is entitled to enter into the debtor’s agreements albeit the performance 
is of enduring and complicated nature.81 
 
                                                
77 Vedlegg 201205 p. 6. 
78 Prop. 1988/89:76, Köplag 180 m jfr 181 y and 184 y, Håstad, Den nya köprätten p. 187 footnoot 9.   
79 Prop 1988/89: 76, p. 183. 
80 See Art 4(b) CISG, see as well Ramberg and Herre, Allmän Köprätt, 2 uppl, p. 118. 
81 Håstad, Den nya Köprätten, 2003, p. 405. 
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As indicated above, Möller comments on long-term contracts, however subsequent to the 
legislative changes, it is hard to predict the contemporary legal situation. Despite the “rule of 
evidence” endorsed by Möller, implying that the estate can not approve due performance 
where the contracted warranties go beyond the predicted duration of the bankruptcy estate, he 
concludes that the bankruptcy estate normally should be entitled to fulfil the seller’s contracts 
even in such cases. For the protection of the buyer he suggest that an obligation is imposed on 
the seller’s bankruptcy estate to set aside funds for future warranty claims, unless it appears 
highly unlikely that that such will arise. Apparently, the new wording of the rules in the SGA, 
that entitles the bankrupt seller’s estate to compel performance, provided that security is 
offered, corresponds to the earlier arguing of Möller and thus implies that the right to cancel 
long-term and valuable contracts is likely to be deprived of the solvent party.82 
 
This outcome is criticised even by commentators in favour of the bankruptcy perspective. 
Håstad argues that the right of the solvent party has not been considered sufficiently in the 
new Goods of Sale Act. He stress that where the contract is considered as personal, security in 
terms of economical guarantee solely comprises a form of surrogate and hence can not be 
considered as satisfactory.83 Where it is clear that the debtor's estate will not perform 
contractually, the solvent party should not be obliged to performance and to satisfy with a 
claim. Håstad suggests exceptions to be carved out, in the 63 § 1 st. SGA, in cases where it is 
clear that the bankruptcy estate will not perform contractually, hence in accordance with 
Norwegian and Danish law.84  
 
Besides, it is generally acknowledged and emphasised in legal doctrine both with regard to the 
seller’s and the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy that applicable rules may favour the bankruptcy 
estate to an excessively extent as opposed to the contrasting previous legal situation.85 
 
Commentators in favour of the bankruptcy perspective often hold that this enquiry is 
generally solved in the individual case due to the fact that the estate is not able to provide 
security and hence must deny its right to entry. Whether the estate should be entitled to so 
called partial entry has been settled in case law. It is submitted that the estate is not entitled 
                                                
82 Möller, 1988, p. 298. 
83 Håstad, Den nya Köprätten, p. 405. 
84 Håstad, Den nya Köprätten, p. 405. 
85 See for instance SOU 2001:80. 
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such right.86 Hence the security provided must correspond to the fully contracted period. 
Noticeably, entry may be practical impossible due to the likely risk that the estate lack 
resources to provide security. However, these aspects are simply of practical importance and 
do not prevent the estate from the legal right to enter. Ramberg argues that the debtor in 
general should not be required to provide extended security, hence if he were able to do so, he 
is unlikely to have encountered insolvency problems in the first place.87 The security provided 
is thus likely to be considered as satisfactory albeit it fails to correspond to the potential risk 
ensuing from such entry. Apparently, application of anticipatory breach in accordance with 
section 62 of SGA is subjected to a number of uncertain factors and hence the risk of entry is 
impending. 
 
5. Mandatory or discretionary rules 
The second basic question is now to be examined, hence wheatear an agreement interfering 
with the right of the debtor’s estate, such as an assignment of the contract to the lenders, as 
prescribed in direct agreements, is effective against the estate. The bankruptcy perspective 
thus implies that rules affecting the debtor’s contract on insolvency are to be mandatory in 
favour of the estate.  
5.1 Different perspectives 
The debate relating to the mandatory or discretionary character of the provisions 
predominantly drives from the fact that the clause that lays down the estate’s right to enter is 
prescribed in the Sale of Goods Act, a law which according to its 3 § is discretionary.88 This 
clause is an expression of the principle of freedom of contract, thus stating that the law shall 
not apply where the parties have agreed upon another solution. However, it is generally 
acknowledge that the principle of freedom of contract is subjected to a number of limitations. 
Mandatory rules as well as general principles with respect to party autonomy for instance, 
prevail over the discretionary content of the SGA.  
 
Håstad supports the mandatory perspective and concludes, in accordance with Möller, that 
given the mandatory character of bankruptcy and property law provision in general, an 
                                                
86 see for instance NJA 1989 s 206, the so called “Piccolo Mondo” Case. 
87 Ramberg and Herre, Allmän Köprätt, 2 uppl, p. 156. 
88 Jmfr prop 1988/89:76 p. 323 f. (See as well Lindskog, Kvittning, Om avräkning av privaträttsliga fordringar, 
1993, p. 172). 
 LEGAL#1568914v2 
agreement can not deprive the estate’s right to enter and hence such agreement is void against 
the estate. Hellner, on the other hand, advocates the contractual perspective and claim that the 
parties are free to determine the content of the contract. He stress that a well-weighted 
balancing of interests can be achieved by applying general contractual principle ensuing from 
section 36 of Law of Contract.89  
 
Lindskog argues that section 63 of the Sale of Goods Act may not be considered as mandatory 
due to the wording of section 3 of the same law. However, he implies that the estate’s right to 
enter may be considered as an expression of a general legal principle (“allmän rättsprincip”) 
and hence of mandatory character. He alleges, in accordance with Håstad, that an agreement 
solely aiming to treat other creditors unfairly is generally considered to be void.90  
 
On the other hand, the principle of anticipated breach is, in Sweden as well as internationally, 
recognised as a general legal principle as well. Hence, supporting the right of the estate to 
entry on the basis of general contractual principles is subjected to inconveniences. Two 
mandatory principles are thus in conflict without appropriate guidance on which one that 
should prevail.91  
5.2 Agreement infringing third party’s right 
The essence of the debate, particularly demonstrated in German, Danish and Norwegian 
literature, is that an agreement may not infringe third parties’ rights. It is held in Norwegian 
preparatory work that an agreement is solely binding upon the contracting parties and hence 
not effective against a third party – the bankruptcy estate. 92 The risk is held to be impending, 
for the debtor and its counterparty to agree upon clauses at disadvantage for other creditors in 
the course of bankruptcy. Given the fact that the debtor will be deprived its right in the 
bankruptcy in any case, there is no incitement for the solvent party and the debtor to take the 
interest of other creditors into account, at time for their agreement. Hence the contracted 
clauses are unlikely to be at disadvantage for the debtor himself, however solely for the 
creditors.  
                                                
89 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt, II:2 3 uppl, p. 90, see as well Hellner in Insolvensrättsligt forum 22-23 january 
1990, p. 198. 
90 Lindskog, Kvittning, Om avräkning av privaträttsliga fordringar, 1993p. 172. 
91 See Tuula footnote 116, refering to Almén, T, Om köp och byte av lös egendom, kommentarer till lagen den 
20 juni, 1924, s 591, the general principle has been accepted of Bengtsson, Hellner and Rhode. See Bengtsson, 
B, Hävningsrätt och uppsägningsrätt vid kontraktsbrott, 1966, Hellner, J, Köprätt, kortfattad lärobok, 4 uppl. 
1974, 9 kap. 
92 NOU 1972:20 p. 310 f . 
 LEGAL#1568914v2 
 
Möller advocates the arguing in Danish and Norwegian legal literature and in conjunction 
herewith he considers the bankrupt estate to be on an equal footing with a “new third party”. 
Albeit the entry of the estate is not legally defined as change of debtor, Möller stress that 
comparison proves adequate. 93 Möller basis his arguing on the fact that assignment of debtor 
requires constant and hence is not permitted. However the bankrupt estate assume the debtor’s 
rights and obligations without obtaining such constant and hence the right of entry for the 
bankrupt estate constitutes, according to Möller, a “new imperative right” in favour of the 
estate.94 Hence, in accordance with Norwegian preparatory work, an agreement is solely 
binding upon the parties and not effective against the bankruptcy estate as a third party.95  
 
Given the fact that the estate is considered as a “new” third party, it is thus not possible to 
include such party into a direct agreement. Conversely, invoking anticipated breach is held to 
be effective prior to the bankruptcy given that there is no real “creditor collective” requiring 
protection at this point of time. Apparently, invoking step in rights prior to the bankruptcy is 
efficient. This also explains why the rules providing for the recapture of assets where the 
transfer is qualified as preferential, because the transaction prejudices other creditors, 
(“återvinningsregler”) are not applicable with regard to cancellation of contracts. Apparently, 
prior to the bankruptcy, cancellation may not be considered as unjustifiable to other creditors 
and hence not subjected to the rules of recapture.96 
 
The Swedish preparatory work does not take position in this regard. It is held that whether the 
estate’s right to entry is to be considered as mandatory or discretionary is far too controversial 
and extended to several legal areas hence; the answer can not be given in a proposition solely 
considering the Goods of Sale Act. References are made to the Bankruptcy Act however 
without explaining how these rules shall apply.97 Hence, the contemporary legal situation is 
fluid. 
 
                                                
93  Konkurslagen 1:1 § st. 2. 
94 Möller, 1988,  p. 59 ff. 
95 NOU 1972:20 p. 310 f . 
96 See Håstad, Den nya Köprätten, p. 404, Tuula, p. 22. 
97 Prop 1988/89:76 p. 232 f, See as well Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2 p. 90, Insolvensrättsligt forum 22-23 
januari 1990, p. 169 ff. 
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6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the principal rule in analogy with section 63 of SGA, stating that the debtor’s 
estate is entitled to compel the solvent party to performance, is likely to apply with regard to 
the contractual relationship between the project company and the project company in course 
of the latter’s bankruptcy. However exceptions may be acknowledge according to section 62 
of SGA and the general principle of anticipatory breach due to the costly and long durable 
contract. The debtor’s estate can not assure appropriate economical and personal requirements 
during the fully contracted period and hence there will be a fundamental breach of contract, 
because the estate lacks preconditions to perform contractually. The solvency of the project 
company is thus likely to comprise an essential precondition for the due performance and 
hence its insolvency, per se, constitutes an anticipated breach.  
 
However, application of anticipatory breach is subjected to a number of uncertain factors and 
hence the risk of entry is impending. The solvent party may be deprived of its contractual 
right to cancel as a consequence of the estate’s right to provide security, and thereby 
preventing the lenders from exercising their step in right as well.  
 
The likelihood for the lenders to invoke their right to step in, directly against the debtor’s 
estate is subjected to uncertainty as well. The legal situation is fluid and hence in accordance 
with the conclusion made in the Norwegian law proposal, it can not be excluded that the 
project company’s bankrupt estate is entitled a mandatory right to enter into the project 
company’s contracts.  
 
7. Balancing of interests 
The legal situation may not be predicted accurately without an adequate balance of interests. 
Hellner emphasises that it is not sufficient to hang on to the contractual or bankruptcy 
perspective, thus, pros and cons must be inventoried.98 Möller concludes that above it all it is 
a matter of balancing the interest of the solvent party in protection and the interest of the 
bankruptcy estate, viz. the other creditors. Apparently, even though the “contractual” or the 
“bankruptcy” perspective is upheld, de lege lata acknowledge reason to be made to the 
different, and to some extent conflicting, interests come into play when the solvent public 
                                                
98 Hellner, Speciell kontraktsrätt, II:2, p.89-90. 
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party want to cancel, or the lenders wish to exercise their right to step in, and the project 
company’s bankrupt’s estate wishes to continue the contract.99 This balance of interest also 
comprises the basis for the law reform presented below. Albeit this essay to some extent 
deliberates the right of the public party to independently cancel the lenders ability to step in, 
the primary objective is to examine the right of the solvent party to cancel when such step in 
right occurs, hence the efficiency of direct agreements. The two theoretical starting points of 
the examination of the efficiency of direct agreements presented previously, are here merged 
into a general analysis. Hence, whether the solvent party should be entitled to cancel, and 
whether the lender’s step in rights are efficient directly against the bankrupt estate, is 
examined as one within this context. In addition, it is important to note that a law reform must 
consider these aspects as well. 
7.1 The interest of the solvent party as opposed to the estate 
The debate in legal literature predominantly deliberates the interests of the two perspectives of 
the solvent party as opposed the debtor’s estate. The rules regarding the estate right of entry is 
comparable with the rules providing for the recapture of assets where the transfer is qualified 
as preferential. Hence, the objective is to protect the creditors from the risk that is likely to 
emerge in course of the debtor’s insolvency and bankruptcy. So far, advocators of the 
contractual as well as the bankruptcy perspective are of the same opinion. However, the 
extent and the legal technique of such creditor protection are in contention.  
 
The contractual perspective suggests the starting point to be that the creditors should be given 
protection from the debtor’s contracting party wanting to get rid of contracts that are onerous 
on the basis that the solvent party would be unjustifiable preferred ahead of other creditors if 
he would be entitled to cancel such contracts.100 
 
Möller concludes that the effects of the of the rules on the treatment of the contracts in 
bankruptcy should be such that the interest of the bankruptcy estate in being able to fulfil the 
debtor’s contracts for a favourable liquidation of the business should be satisfied as far as 
possible. However, without the solvent party’s incurring a not inconsiderable further damage 
                                                
99 Möller, 1988, p. 39 ff. 
100 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, p. 83 and Tuula, p. 22. 
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or inconvenience beyond what he would have suffered if the contracts had instead been 
cancelled on the day of the bankruptcy judgement.101 
 
Unsurprisingly, Möller’s conclusion, representing the general “bankruptcy perspective”, 
implies that the interest of the creditor as a whole is generally held to prevail over the interest 
of the solvent party in protection.102 The key arguments invoked in this regard is based on the 
risk, held to be likely, for the solvent party and the debtor, at the time for their agreement, to 
not consider interest of other creditors in the course of bankruptcy and hence for clauses to be 
contracted in a way that prejudice other creditors. 
 
Furthermore, the interest of the estate is held to outweigh the interest of the solvent party 
because the latter is generally held not to incur particular inconveniences due to the entry. 
This is based on the fact that the solvent party generally does not have any other option. In the 
debate relating to construction contracts, Möller stresses that the client generally encounters 
inconveniences in finding a substitute to complete the construction work in any case and 
concludes that entitling the estate to enter is even advantageous for the solvent party. Besides, 
given the fact that the debtor’s estate is not obliged to fulfil the solvent party’s obligations, 
Möller argues that the entry comprises the better solution for the solvent party, who would 
otherwise had been satisfied with a contractual breach and a claim against the bankruptcy 
estate. It is thus, according to Möller reasonable to apply the general “frees principle” that 
have crystallised in bankruptcy with regard to security, on contracts as well. Parties’ 
obligations and rights should freeze to what have fall due on the day of the bankruptcy 
judgement and hence future claims can not be considered. Möller derives this conclusion from 
applicable provisions on the ladder of priorities that creditors are paid according to ensuing 
from the 11 chapter in the Bankruptcy Act and the Reorganisation Act (utdelnings- och 
förmånsrättsregler).103 
 
The interest of the estate is clearly expressed in the 7 chapter of the Bankruptcy Act. 
According to its section 8 the administrator is obliged to consider the creditors collectively 
right. The interest of the estate should thus be protected in order to achieve the best result for 
                                                
101 Möller, 1988, p 842. 
102 See for instance Möller 1988, p. 39 ff , Tuula p. 21, Hellner II:2, p. 81 ff, and Håstad, Sakrätt, p. 398 ff. 
103 Möller, 1988, p. 76 
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the company’s creditors as a whole. Additionally, the administrator is obliged to act in order 
to achieve an advantageous and efficient liquidation.104  
 
The questions to be examined here are thus the particular interests and risks that are at stake in 
private public partnership and whether the objectives and arguments invoked in favour of the 
bankruptcy perspective, and expressed in the Bankruptcy Act 7:8, can be achieved by entitling 
the estate to enter into the project company’s contract, and more specifically, the project 
contract.  
7.2 Interest of the creditors as a whole 
The theoretical starting point with regard to project finance and PPP is thus that the project 
contract amount to certain value for the estate. There are a number of aspects speaking in 
favour of the protection of the estate and its creditors. Given the project company’s limited 
assets, the project contract basically amount to the whole value of the bankruptcy estate and 
hence what is left for the creditors in a liquidation. However, on the day of the bankruptcy, 
the project contract will be subjected to the freeze principle and hence become rather 
valueless. The objective of entry would thus be for the estate to complete the project and 
thereby being entitled the whole compensation sum from the public client, that is payable 
after completed work. Besides, the bankrupt estate has the opportunity to sell the project. 
 
It is clear that cancellation may deprive the debtor and the creditors of this profitable contract 
producing a gain for the estate. The interest of the creditor’s as a whole and an advantageous 
and efficient liquidation is certainly infringed if the bankruptcy estate is prevented from entry.  
 
However, the first point to be made is who “all these creditors” are that the liquidator is 
obliged to act in favour of and that is held to outweigh the interest of the solvent party. 
Whether an agreement that infringes the right of the estate to accede to the debtor’s contract is 
efficient is solely examined from the solvent party perspective. Apparently, the rules 
regarding the estate’s right of entry predominantly refers to cases where the solvent party 
amounts to a bare minimum of all the creditors. However, in this regard, cancellation of the 
solvent party entitles the syndicated lenders to step in and hence incorporate the major part of 
the creditors.  
 
                                                
104 Konkurslagen 7:8 § 
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The efficiency of an agreement that includes other creditors beyond the solvent party wishing 
to cancel is thus not deliberated in doctrine. However, in the debate relating to construction 
contracts and the client’s bankruptcy, Möller comment very briefly on clauses that entitle 
banks to assume construction contracts and complete the work, where the work is not 
completed accurately. He implies that banks solely are entitled to invoke such clauses where 
the estate wishes not to accede and hence where the contract is cancelled. This is based on the 
fact that the estate has the entire disposal of the debtor’s assets, provided that the debtor is in 
possession of the property. Hence, it is held that the lenders may not prevent the estate from 
selling the building at the day of the bankruptcy. However Möller stress the lenders may buy 
the property from the estate. Besides, given the fact that the lenders have security over the 
property, the lenders may prevent the bankruptcy estate from selling the uncompleted building 
according to the “Utsökningsbalk” chapter 12.105 Möller does not comment upon such clauses 
in case of the entrepreneur’s bankruptcy. 
7.2.1 The principle of equality 
Albeit the right of the solvent party to cancel comes into another light given the lenders’ step 
in rights, the provision in the Bankruptcy Act stating that the liquidator must act in favour of 
“all the lenders” is nevertheless violated. Hence, if the lenders were entitled to step in they 
would be preferred ahead of other creditors. Unlike the English system of administrative 
receiver that still apply with regard to project finance, creditor’s may not, according to 
Swedish law, decide upon the enforcement remedy and run the business solely in favour of 
the secured creditors. In Sweden the principle of equality prevails and hence all the creditors 
are treated equal. Apparently the principle of freedom of contract is here outweighed of the 
principle of equality.  
 
Contemporary literature does not distinguish between creditors and do not specify the actual 
meaning of the “creditor collective”.106 The wording in doctrine solely draw attention to “all 
the creditors” without distinguishing between different grade of protection among creditors, 
hence, the principle of equality can be said to be taken as a form of “silent” point of departure. 
Martinsson indicates the risks induced making use of such a language. However, he 
predominantly refers to the principle of freedom of contracts in this regard and advocates the 
                                                
105 Möller, 1988, p. 283. 
106 See for instance Möller, 1988, p. 75.  
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importance of openness and that principles may be overvalued and marginalise other 
important interests.107 
 
“Partly as a result of the unarticulated and rudimentary argumentation, certain interests are 
overvalued. One such interest, the freedom of contract, is often taken as a point of departure 
for the analysis and various factors straighten this tendency. Three such factors worthy of 
mention are the following: the parties to the agreement are the ones that provide the elements 
of the contractual construction; a belief in the existence of regulatory competition between 
different legal systems, and, the use of terminology, where classifications in main rules and 
exceptions, marginalizes important interest. “108 
 
However with regard to project finance and public private partnership the principle taken as a 
point of departure is rather the principle of equality. In this regard it may be questioned why 
such principle should be upheld and prevail over the principle of freedom of contracts. It is 
often said that the most fundamental principle of bankruptcy is the pari passu or pro rata 
payment of creditors, the interest of equality is upheld by such principle however 
consideration is nevertheless made to the proportion of each of the creditor’s debt.109  
7.2.2 Interest of protection of different creditors 
Thus, who are all the creditors involved in project finance and what constitutes their interest 
of protection?   
 
The concept of private public partnerships as well as the financing techniques may vary. 
However, the most commonly used technique and primarily referred to here is the “Build 
Operate Transfer” model (“BOT”). This is the technique used in Norway and is here called 
OPS (“Offentligt Privat Samarbete”).110 BOT projects are defined by Uncitral as projects 
where the contracting public party selects a private sector party “to finance and construct an 
infrastructure facility or system and gives the entity the right to operate it commercially for a 
certain period, at the end of which the facility is transferred to the contracting authority”.111  
 
                                                
107 Martinsson, Claes, Kreditsäkerhet i fakturafordringar, 2002. 
108 Martinsson, Kreditsäkerhet i fakturafordringar, 2002.  
109 See for instance Wood, Principles of insolvency, 1996, p. 10. 
110 Närings- og handelsdepartementet & KPMG AS, p. 17. 
111 Uncitral, United Nations, 2001, p. 5. 
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According to the model used in Norway, the project company is entitled to receive payment 
from the Norwegian Public Roads Administration. However, no payments are received before 
the road sections are opened and available for traffic. The payments are hereafter made in 
terms and provided that certain requirements are met such as quality, availability, safety and 
environment etc. Apparently, the public party reduces its risks in that the private sector is not 
entitled to receive any payments until the road construction is completed. The project 
company is thus not only retaining all the responsibility for the financing (and the 
construction, operating and maintenance) of the project however assumes the major risks 
associated with the project as well.  
7.2.2.1 Interest of the project sponsors and the senior lenders 
Hence, the interest of protection for the project sponsors and the project company appears to 
be prominent. However, large scale infrastructure projects are often highly leveraged which 
means that the projects are predominantly and sometimes exclusively financed by debt 
capital.112 Hence, the share capital provided by the project sponsors solely amount to a bare 
minimum compared to the debt capital raised by the syndicated lenders. Besides, the risks for 
the project sponsors are already reduced by so called single purpose vehicles (SPV), that are 
generally used, companies solely established for the purpose of carrying out the project in 
question. This is generally described as non-recourse or limited-recourse techniques. Given 
such technique, the project creditors may only rely on the assets held by the project company 
and thus cannot take recourse to the assets held by the individual project sponsors.  
 
Furthermore, as emphasised previously, the assets that are held by the project company are 
often very limited and uncertain. Hence, the creditors base their financing decisions almost 
exclusively on the expected future revenues of the project in question. Besides, BOT-projects 
are usually very capital-intensive and therefore require large amounts of financing.113 
Apparently the risk induced in financing large infrastructure projects is exceptionally high and 
it is predominantly the syndicated lenders that are exposed to such risk.  
7.2.2.2 The interest of other unsecured creditors 
What about the other unsecured creditors? Given the fact that the lenders seeks to take 
security over as much assets as legally possible, there are reasons to consider the interest of 
                                                
112 Merna & Cyrus, Financing and managing of infrastructure projects, p. 98. 
113 Merna & Cyrus, Financing and managing of infrastructure projects, p. 98. 
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protection of unsecured creditors. The primarily purpose of the lenders security is thus 
defensive, to act as “a shield not a sword”.114 By taking security, the secured creditors limit 
the possibility of the unsecured creditors interfering in the relationship between the project 
debtor and the secured creditors.115 The taking of security also limits the risk for, and potential 
negative affects of, any attachments or enforcements that the unsecured creditors may pursue 
against the project company. Apparently, there is not much room of protection left out for 
unsecured creditors. However, the point is that given the particular SPV technique, there are 
few unsecured creditors to protect. The unsecured creditors worth mention in this regard are 
suppliers. 
 
Nevertheless, the primary risks for the suppliers can be summarised to not get paid for 
outstanding debt, the bankruptcy of the project company or to be forced to performance where 
the prospects for the due performance of the project are dubious, as in case if the estate enter 
into their agreements or into the project agreement. Apparently, these aspects are already 
considered in direct agreements. In fact, third parties have already consent to deprive its right 
to cancel provided that the lenders step in and complete the project in question. In order to 
deprive the suppliers of their cancellation right the lenders have agreed to compensate them 
for all owing debts. It appears that the risks induced for the suppliers can not be compared 
with the risks the lenders are exposed to.  
 
The primary basis behind the creditor’s acceptance of being deprived of their cancellation 
right, can be traced to the exceptionally high risks-exposure implied in project finance. The 
creditors are clearly aware of this reality and that it is primarily the syndicated lenders who 
are exposed such risk. More important however, entitling the lenders to step in definitely 
increases their own chances of obtaining anything, compared to the unfavourable outcome of 
a bankruptcy proceeding, with or without entitling the estate to complete the project. 
7.2.3 The objective of a favourable liquidation 
Given the reduced asset of the project company, a bankruptcy proceeding will hardly suffice 
to even compensate secured creditors. All the other creditors, except for the syndicated 
lenders, are thus unsecured or subordinated lenders and hence the outcome of a bankruptcy 
proceeding is unlikely to be with any prospects of success for “all the creditors”. 
                                                
114 Wood, Project Finance, p. 30. 
115 Vinter, Project Finance, 1998, p. 149. 
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The result would not be different if the debtor’s estate were entitled to entry into the project 
contracts, most likely the contrary. The first point to be made here is that the hypothetical 
options available for the estate related to the right of entry as portrayed previously, are 
somehow nothing but theoretical. As indicated above (under the chapter economical aspects 
and long-term agreements) the entry of the estate is subjected to a number of inconveniences. 
Depending on how far the project has gone, the estate is unlikely to complete the work prior 
to the predicted bankruptcy estate. The entire duration of these projects is proximately 20 
years, hence, the estate may never accomplish the operating and maintenance periods. Given 
that the estate lacks resources and skills to complete the project on its own, it is generally 
obliged to sell the project. Apparently, assignment is nevertheless compulsory and hence the 
estate will encounter problems in obtaining necessary consents from third parties. Most 
important however, since there is no established market for infrastructure facilities such as 
roads and railways etc. the prise paid in liquidation by selling the project as a “going concern” 
would almost certainly not generate much income. The alternative to entitle the lender’s to 
step in and complete the project provides a better solution in several aspects.  
 
Apparently, the objective of a financially advantageous liquidation of debtor’s business in 
favour of all the creditors is unlikely be achieved by entitling the estate to enter into the 
project agreement. On the contrary, all the creditors fear such entry; hence, being compelled 
to performance without any prospect of success for the continuation of the debtor’s business, 
or the outcome of a combined sale, exposes them to an exceptionally high risk.  
7.2.4 Deficit of incitement for the debtor to protect its creditors 
Hence, avoiding bankruptcy as far as possible is definitely a common interest of all the 
creditors. The question is thus how bankruptcy can be prevented. This deliberates the key 
argument of the lacking insensitive for the debtor to consider all the creditors in case of 
bankruptcy.  
 
Again, this must be traced back to the particular risks induced in project finance. The 
solvency of the project company is thus dependent on the future payments from the client, the 
public counterparty. Both the equity holders and the creditors focus their attention on the 
prospective future revenues of the project company. Careful evaluations are thus made before 
a project is implemented, in order to guarantee that the project will generate sufficient return 
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during its lifetime to service the debt and repay the equity with a return that is suitable to the 
risks that the equity holders are exposed to. To put it straight, everything that impedes the 
project from continuing according to contracted terms comprises key threats for all creditors. 
Particular delays and other uncertain factors are thus considered as potential threats.  
 
A contracting party wanting to cancel its contractual obligations definitely comprises an 
outstanding potential threat that might lead to chain effects and inconvenience in finding a 
substitute. Accordingly, the short-term interest of one party is in conflict with the long-term 
interest of the due performance of the project. When a single party lack incentives to act in a 
way that appears to be favourable for the entity, can in economical theory terms be described 
as a market failure and hence require to be corrected somehow. Apparently, this is the whole 
basis behind the debate of right of the debtor’s estate to enter into the debtor’s contract. The 
market failure or the interest of the estate and the creditor as a whole is to be upheld by 
mandatory provisions. However, in this regard, the parties have corrected the market failure 
themselves in direct agreements as well in other contractual work.  
 
As stressed previously, all the creditors are aware of the exceptionally risks induced in project 
finance the inconveniences encountered in case of bankruptcy. Apparently, all these aspects 
are taken into account and carefully negotiated with the objective to allocate the risks to the 
parties who are best equipped to manage them. The contracted documentation is thus very 
extensive and every individual contract can be described as a part of an entire net, hence the 
efficiency of the entirety is depended on each single agreement. This may be illustrated by the 
fact that a single change in a particular contract generally requires changes in a number of 
contracts. 
 
Direct agreements can be said to comprise part of the core of this net of contracts in that its 
primary function is to safeguard the objective for all creditors, hence to keep the project alive. 
Without such cautious assessment, banks would not be willing to provide funds for large 
infrastructure projects. In order to finance such projects they must be what is generally 
described as “bankable”. Nevertheless, high risk would increase the price of the lending, a 
cost that in the end would be borne by the client hence the public. The efficiency of direct 
agreements is thus a precondition for the project to become bankable. Besides the other 
creditors are liberated from the key financial risks and have so agreed upon entitling the 
lenders step in rights, hence a reasonable price to pay. Contracting parties such as suppliers 
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etc. that have entered into direct agreements and thereby consent to deprive its contractual 
cancellation rights are besides compensated by the lenders in that they guarantee all owing 
debts.  
 
Apparently, entitling the lenders to step in definitely comprises the better solution for “all the 
creditors” compared to what they would have obtained as un-preferred creditors in a winding 
up proceeding or succeeding the liquidator’s entry into affected contracts.  
 
Albeit the key objective for the lenders to negotiate step in rights are to safeguard their own 
interests, this appears to be the most convenient solution for all the parties’ involved. 
Apparently the interest of preserving the principle of freedom of contracts appears to be 
essential. Besides, the key argument invoked in favour of the bankruptcy perspective, stating 
that there are no incentives for the debtor to consider other creditors, proves to be poor with 
regard to project finance. Indeed, the factual presence of direct agreements renders the 
argumentation inadequate. Direct agreements can be described as a form of “private work 
out” and hence certainly take the interest of other creditors into account.  
 
Given the fact that the creditors have agreed upon a common solution that appears to be the 
most convenient, it may definitely be questioned who “all the creditors” are that requires 
mandatory protection. Hellner supports the argumentation here invoked and advocates that the 
conflict of interests can be complicated and that general conclusions can not be upheld, such 
as that the debtor, when he enters into agreements, has no interest of protecting his creditors 
in case of bankruptcy.116 
 
Apparently, a balancing of the interest of protection between the different creditors certainly 
speaks in favour of at least to some extent give preference to secured lenders as opposed to 
other creditors. However, direct agreements may be negotiated in different ways and hence 
solely provided that the agreements prove to be reasonably, such conclusion prevails. 
7.3 The Interest of the public and the solvent party 
The final key argument referred to above, in favour of the interest of the estate and its 
creditors to prevail over the interest of the solvent party due to that the latter is generally held 
to not incur any inconsiderable inconveniences from the entry of the estate, is to be examined 
                                                
116 Hellner, Speciell avtalsrätt II:2, p. 83. 
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as well. With regard to project finance in general and private public partnership in particular, 
the solvent party is not solely a contracting party however, constitutes a public interest. 
Hence, the interest of the solvent party is equivalent to the public interest of obtaining 
infrastructure. 
 
Albeit the obligation of the project company may not be classified as personal according to 
the traditional meaning of personal attribute, it is nevertheless essential for the public 
counterparty that its contractual right to cancel in case of the project company’s bankruptcy 
remains efficient.  
7.3.1 Economical risks 
As indicated previously, the public counterparty has reduced its risk in that the payments are 
made subsequent to the completion of the project, however, the risks are far from eliminated. 
Besides, the step in rights for the lenders is solely a right and hence failure of the project 
company often results in that the public counterparty is obliged to take over the project and 
the economical burdens as well.117  
 
The bankrupt estate is unlikely to perform contractually, particularly due to the extended and 
costly project. Proper performance is depended on subcontracting parties. The estate is 
generally entitled to enter into these contracts as well, however, subcontractors may in 
analogy with the 63 section of SAG claim security that the estate may not be able to provide. 
The estate may thus be forced to find new contracting parties such as constructors and 
suppliers and hence the argument invoked in favour of the bankruptcy perspective, claiming 
that the same contracting parties may be employed, is not compelling. New constants must be 
obtained from individual or from all contracting parties, following an assignment of the whole 
project company. Besides, the consequences for the solvent party is generally emphasised in 
legal literature, where the bankrupt estate first, for the period of the bankruptcy, enter into the 
project contract itself and solely employ third parties, and thereafter accomplish an 
assignment. Möller stress that in cases where the duration of the performance goes beyond the 
time for the bankruptcy, it is doubtful if the solvent party should be compelled to 
performance, the client should not be required to accept two assignments of the contracts, first 
the entry of the estate and secondly a new counterparty subsequent to the bankruptcy.118 
                                                
117 See for instance Standardisation of PFI Contracts, Version 3, HM Treasury, April 2004, p. 133 ff. 
118 Möller, 1988 p. 292. 
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Besides the risk that key personal will leave due to the bankruptcy render the performance 
uncertain. Apparently, due performance can not be assured, risk for delay is outstanding and 
hence the price payable for the public will amount to a significantly higher amount than if the 
solvent party would be entitled to cancel on the day of the bankruptcy.  
7.3.2 Quality risks 
Most important, entitling the bankrupt to complete the project does not solely imposes 
economical however quality risk as well. The solvent public party is responsible for the 
quality of the public facility in terms of function, security, environment, etc. New contracting 
parties may not guarantee contracted quality. If the facility in question concerns the 
construction of a road for instance, quality such as the security for the road-users, accessibility 
and environmental concerns may not be met.  
 
The duration of the project is vital in this regard. The quality of the public facility must be 
granted not solely during the construction phase however after the project is completed and 
opened up for the public. Given the fact that the administrator is obliged to act in order to 
achieve a favourable and efficient liquidation in favour of all creditors, the factual interest of 
the infrastructure project in question is likely to be ignored. The administrator is not in any 
case obliged to consider the long-term objectives of the public facility. Hence there is no 
incitement for the estate to grant quality during the operation and maintenance period. Albeit 
the estate is to assign the whole project it is not clear whether the new party may guarantee 
the long-term conditions. The estate has thus no interest, obligation or incitements to protect 
the quality of the performance succeeding the duration of the bankruptcy. The administrator 
may even violate his obligations according to the 7 chapter 8 section of the Bankruptcy Act, if 
these aspects are taken into consideration since the performance may be more expensive and 
long-lasting.  
 
The impending risk of the bankruptcy estate not to perform contractually was held to be one 
of the key factors behind the legislative law reform in Norway, particularly due to the public 
interest of infrastructure.119 
                                                
119 Vedlegg 201205, p. 6. 
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7.4 The interest of company rehabilitation 
Albeit the outcome of a balancing of interests appears to be clear and hence speaks in favour 
of depriving the estate of its right of entry, uncertainty de lege lata prevails. However, the 
most contemporary prominent threat to the validity of such balancing, is the interest of 
rescuing companies as going concerns. At first sight considering such interest appears to have 
no bearing on project finance, particularly due to the non-resource finance technique. The 
project company solely comprises a shell and is thus unlikely to be subjected to rehabilitation 
proceedings.  
 
However, given the increased attention and preference in favour of rehabilitation process in 
the insolvency debate all over Europe, it is crucial to take these aspects into consideration as 
well. Nevertheless, the trend demonstrated in Europe definitely indicates an increased 
willingness to weaken the superiority of secured creditors. Since step in rights give preference 
to secured lenders it is most likely that legislators regard such rights with hostility. In many 
countries in Europe, particularly demonstrated in our Nordic neighbour countries, the two 
proceedings of bankruptcy and company reorganisation are now integrated. A consequence of 
such merge is that the rules of the estate’s right to enter have become mandatory with 
exception for certain contractual relationships as described above.120 The Swedish Company 
Rehabilitation Act (CRA) Chapter 2 section 20, already lays down mandatory provisions of 
the right of the estate to enter into the debtor’s contract. 
 
As mentioned previously, the Swedish law proposal considering the debtor’s agreements in 
insolvency have not been implemented due to the coming proposal of incorporating the two 
proceedings. The need is firmly expressed in contemporary literature and various proposals on 
how such legislative act could be formulated are presented. As a step in the direction towards 
an integrated insolvency procedure, the Committee presented a proposal regarding general 
rules governing the bankrupt’s estate’s accession to the debtor’s agreement, largely in accord 
with the rules proposed for company reorganisation.121 Apparently, it is just a matter of time 
before a legislative reform will be implemented and hence an examination without 
considering these aspects is moderately a waste of time.  
                                                
120 SOU 2001:80 p. 25. 
121 SOU 2001:80 p. 26. 
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7.4.1 The objective of improving business 
The driving force behind the extended focus on company rehabilitation in Sweden thus 
correspond to the debate in the Nordic Countries as well as the wording behind the new 
security regime in England (and Wales) that abolished the right of a qualifying charge holder 
to appoint an administrative receiver. In UK, clearing banks have been considered to be too 
quick to enforce their security and break up business which might have survived as going 
concerns. Administrative receivership was perceived as almost an instrument of repression 
not just of failing companies, but also of their unsecured trade creditors. With every company 
whose asset were broken up and sold by the bank’s receivers, so another outlet for that 
company’s erstwhile suppliers failed. In this way the financial collapse of yet further 
companies was made more likely.122  
 
Albeit, the Swedish security law has not been weighted as heavily in favour of secured 
creditors as in England, the same arguments prevail. The process started with the New Right 
of Priority Rules where floating charges were converted into a general right of priority and 
that security should cover one half of the value of all the debtor’s property.123 During the 
course of its work the Committee was issued with supplementary terms of references to 
investigate whether, during a company reorganisation, the debtor should be entitled to 
terminate agreements prematurely. In conjunction therewith, certain other issues concerning 
the debtor’s agreement in company reorganisation proceedings were investigated and the need 
for clarification and amendments was expressed. Besides the need to incorporate into the 
Bankruptcy Act general rules regarding termination and performance of the debtor’s 
agreements by means of the estate’s accession thereto was stressed, corresponding to the rules 
to apply in the event of company reorganisation.124 
 
The primary objective of the New Right of Priority Rules and the essence of the debate in 
Europe is thus to improve the environment of business, predominantly with regard to small 
enterprises. Hence, the possibility for healthy business to rehabilitate is to be improved and 
the number of bankruptcy proceedings reduced. Besides, the interest of enterprise is 
considered by strengthen unsecured creditor’s, such as suppliers, priority rights in the event of 
Bankruptcy.  
                                                
122 These thoughts were presented by the Labour Party in Opposition during the recession in UK in the early 
1990. 
123 SOU 1999:1. 
124 SOU 2001:80 p. 25. 
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In conjunction with the reform in England the interest of banks to take a more expansive and 
long-term view was articulated as well. Some commentators expressed far-reaching reforms 
with the belief of achieving an effective point of leverage in order to produce a market 
dynamic toward more long-term lending.125 Will Hutton stress that privileging banks in 
insolvency proceedings encourages short-term credit. Instead of relying on a favourable legal 
system banks should according to Hutton do the “legwork” them selves, if they want to lend 
money safely. Downgrading banks legal importance in insolvency proceedings would 
encourage them to evaluate business, requiring better business plans and financial skills from 
their customer base, instead of evaluating business in terms of property, Hutton continues.126 
 
However, the quandary of promoting the environment of business is highly complex and 
controversial. The New Right of Priority Rules have been subjected to vast critic from 
interests of enterprises as well represents from banks, claiming that the reform will generate 
higher price of lending and thus make it harder for (small) enterprises to obtain capital. 
Hence, the new rules are held to rather counteract the objective of improving the conditions of 
business since the availability of capital is considered to be the most essential factor in order 
to promote business, definitely more crucial than the ranking of priority in bankruptcy. 
7.4.2 The American Chapter 11 proceeding and de lege ferenda 
Some authors in Swedish as well as in English literature suggest the American Bankruptcy 
Code to serve as a model.127 The insolvency proceedings are here integrated into one single 
Act and the rules for each proceeding correspond to a large extent, Chapter 11 lays down rules 
on company rehabilitation and chapter 7 refers to bankruptcy. The US model goes further than 
the Norwegian and Danish insolvency rules in that the solvent party is automatically deprived 
its right to cancel as soon as a proceeding has commenced. 
 
Section 365 (e) of the Bankruptcy Act nullifies default clauses which permit the other party to 
terminate on the insolvency of the debtor. The section provides that, albeit a provision in an 
executory contract (or unexpired lease or in applicable law), an executory contract (or 
unexpired lease) of the debtor may not be terminated or modified at any time after the 
commencement of the case solely because of the insolvency or financial condition of the 
                                                
125 the Labour Party in Opposition during the recession in UK in the early 1990. 
126 Hutton, Will, the State to Come, 1997, p. 72. 
127 See for instance Tuula p. 178 and Will Hutton. 
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debtor, or the commencement of the case or the appointment of a trustee, i.e. standard 
contractual events of default which spark off on insolvency and the institution of insolvency 
proceeding are nullified.128 
 
It appears that step in rights goes hereunder and hence is nullified under US insolvency law. 
Step in rights are not commented in American project finance literature and not commonly 
used.129 However, the project deliberated for the purpose of this essay originates from Europe 
and hence English law is generally selected to apply.  
 
A contract that contains a provision permitting the counterparty to cancel on insolvency is 
internationally recognised as ipso facto clauses. Bankruptcy legislation that nullifies ipso 
facto clauses such as the US model is in an international perspective uncommon. There are 
few countries that expressly nullify such clauses, mention can primarily be made to France, 
Canada and New Zeeland.130 However, because of the savage effect upon contracts of the 
statutory freeze, certain exceptions have been carved out by the American bankruptcy code.131 
 
The law reform in England did not go as far as such “debtor-in-possession”, court-supervised 
company rehabilitation system as in US. However, the debate in Swedish literature points at 
this direction. It must be emphasis that there is a vast danger induced in solely implementing a 
procedure ensuing from a completely different law tradition into Swedish law. As stressed 
previously, promoting business is highly complex and there are a number of aspects to 
consider. The law of insolvency must be seen in conjunction with other law provisions that 
lays down rules for companies, particular attention must be made to the Company Act.  
 
US do not have a homogenous legal culture and applicable (insolvency) law indicates “pro-
debtor” as well as “pro-creditor” attitudes. Wood stress there is an acute conflict between 
these attitudes.132 Without making any judgements of the US insolvency law it must however 
be stressed that a legal system can be described as a form of  balance where for instance a pro-
debtor Company Reorganisation and Bankruptcy Act can be balanced by a more pro-creditor 
Company Act. The most essential rules in order to prevent insolvency proceedings in US can 
                                                
128 Section 365 (e) of the Insolvency Act 1986. 
129 Interview with Denis Petkovic, practitioner at Chadbourne & Parke, London. 
130 Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, 1996, p. 65-68. 
131 Exceptions are made for personal contracts for instance, see section 365, see as well Wood, Principles of 
International Insolvency p. 68. 
132 Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, 1996, p. 8 
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rather be said to be found is the Company Act. The US Company Act stipulates responsibility 
for the insolvency of a company, of other persons than the company such as directors and 
officers, to spark of at a considerably earlier stage than in Swedish law. Thus, the 
environment of business can only be improved by balancing different law provisions and it 
may be questioned whether the most efficient way of improving business can be achieved by 
mandatory rules on the treatment of the bankrupt’s contract. There may be reasons to at least 
complement such law with rules aiming to create insensitive for business, such as endorse 
company directors to take proper responsibility for their business at an early stage for 
instance.   
    
It is not my purpose to examine this further however solely point out that there are reasons to 
consider the whole legal context in the debate of the treatment of debtors contract in 
insolvency and the interest of company rehabilitation. Given that a model works out in one 
country does not necessarily mean that it proves successful in another, particularly because of 
deviating principles prescribed in different jurisdiction’s Company Acts.  
 
Besides, the objective of this essay is to examine the rules on insolvency with regard to 
project finance and hence the wording of general applicable rules is left out as well.  
Nevertheless, these aspects indicates that the choice between a “debtor-in-possession”, court-
supervised company rehabilitation system and a system encouraging private work out 
initiatives giving credence to the principle of freedom of contract is far from evident. Besides, 
with regard to the rules on the bankrupt’s contracts, it is clear that different contracts require 
different solutions, hence a factor that must be weighted against the interest of legal certainty 
and the objective of consistency.  
7.4.3 The objective of company rehabilitation and project finance  
However, against the background presented above, considering project finance, there are 
certain factors speaking in favour of giving preference to the principle of freedom of contract. 
The interests and objectives uttered in the debate of company rehabilitation are most likely to 
be achieved by entitling the lenders to step in and hence give effect to the parties contracted 
“private work out”.  
 
General mandatory provisions can not consider the particular interests and risks that come 
into play with regard to project finance. The parties involved fear a court supervised processes 
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where the liquidator enter into the project contract thus such formal process comprises one of 
the most fundamental threat to the expected cash flow. A statutory freeze has savage effects 
upon contracts and may prejudice creditor protections, besides a public declaration of 
insolvency generally devastates business. Furthermore, the entry of the estate and a formal 
proceeding is costly and considerably less flexible than a transfer carried out by the lenders. 
The advantages generally recognised with formal proceedings such as the power to bind 
dissentient creditors and that formal proceedings are a statutory freeze on individual creditor 
enforcement, have no validity in this regard since the creditors are already bound according to 
the terms in the direct agreements.133 
 
The objective of step in rights is accurately identical with those prescribed for company 
rehabilitation. The primary objective is to rescue the project company when it encounters 
insolvency problems. Banks are cautious before they chose to exercise their most far-reaching 
step in right thus such entry is connected to fundamental responsibilities and risks. There are a 
number of generally recognised risks such as environmental risks. Besides Swedish law, 
particularly the Swedish Company Act may prescribe certain liability not yet subjected to 
examination. Entry effectively means “management power” and hence certain legal 
responsibility is likely to apply. Whether the Common Law concept of “shadow directors” is 
applicable in this regard has not been subjected to scrutiny in English Case law nor 
commented in literature however there are reasons to investigate such responsibility further. 
Besides, there are reasons to examine whether the transfer to a new entity, which is generally 
held to reduce the responsibility of banks, under Swedish law, may be considered to comprise 
a combine relationship (koncernförhållande) and hence bring about extended responsibilities 
and obligations according to the Swedish Company Act. Furthermore, rules against “self-
dealing”, i.e. a mortgagee selling the mortgaged asset to himself or to a person connected with 
him are applicable.134 The Swedish rule of “förverkande av pant”, lex commissoria according 
to the 37 § of Law of Contracts and 10:2 Commercial Act (“Handelsbalken”)135, must be 
considered as well.  
 
                                                
133 Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, 1996, p. 174. 
134 The rule is basically intended to protect against mortgaged assets being sold at an undervalue and thereby 
constituting unfair foreclosure. The English rule does not appear to be an absolute one but the mortgagee will 
have to prove that the consideration for the transfer of the asset to the connected person was (essentialaly) a fair 
one: See Tse Kwong Lam v. Wong Chit Sen and others (1983) BCLC 88. 
135 Lag(1936) om pantsättning av lös egendom som innehas av tredje man. 
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Nevertheless, the clauses in direct agreements should be contracted in a manner that gives the 
project company a real chance to rehabilitate. If there are no prospects of success for the 
project company to complete the project, the objective of a direct agreement is thus to keep 
the project alive, hence the business affected by bankruptcy shall survive and transferred to a 
new owner. Given that such transfer is anticipated and the contracting parties prematurely 
agreed to consent, the prospects of success is noticeably more likely than if the bankrupt 
estate were to accomplish a transfer.  
 
There is no interest of protection of a single purpose vehicle, an empty shell company without 
own employers and where the project sponsors have attained a reduced risk according to the 
non-resource finance technique. Keeping the project alive thus safeguards the solvency of 
subcontracting companies and the vast quantity of workers here employed, besides the 
chances for key persons to remain are made more likely. Furthermore, it is necessary to take 
the interest of the subcontractors and other claiming derivative rights from the project 
company into account as well. The failure of the head contractor or their immediate contractor 
may, by domino effect, precipitate their own insolvency.136 
 
It is clear that the target of the changes in the insolvency legislation brought about in the 
English Companies Act as well as the basis behind the legislative reforms in Sweden giving 
unsecured creditors increased priority in bankruptcy, chiefly where companies with 
significant unsecured creditors. The various examples given in the English official 
Explanatory Notes to the Act related to the different purposes of administration are service or 
manufacturing companies with trade creditors.137 The political reasoning behind abolishing 
administrative receivership as a means of enforcement of security is far less cogent when 
there are no, insignificant or few unsecured creditors to protect. Hence, this is often the case 
in project finance where the borrowers usually are vehicle companies without significant 
unrelated unsecured creditors. 
 
Apparently, long-term interests are certainly considered by entitling the lender to step in. It is 
rather clear that the public interest of infrastructure overrides the interest of protecting the 
particular insolvent project company, principally as the socio-economic cum labour market 
policy as well as other interests prescribed in favour of mandatory company rehabilitation 
                                                
136 Wood, Principles of International Insolvency, p. 60. 
137 See paragraphs 647 – 652 of the Explanatory Notes to the Enterprise Act 2002. 
 LEGAL#1568914v2 
process is more likely to be achieved by entitling the lenders to take the responsibility to 
complete the project. 
7.5 The early warning technique 
In fact, mandatory rules of the estate’s right of entry have proved to contravene the purpose of 
company rehabilitation. In order to avert the onerous outcome of an insolvency proceeding 
where the estate chooses to entry, and make the project bankable, banks incline to negotiate 
clauses that entitle them to step in at an early stage, before bankruptcy is to be likely.  
7.5.1 Development in Finland 
This is demonstrated in Finland where a new public private partnership has been awarded 
very recently, the E-18 Muurla-Lohja motorway. The project consists of the design, 
construction, maintenance and financing of a 50 kilometre motorway between Helsinki, the 
capital of Finland, and the coastal city Turku and the road is scheduled to be opened in 
2009.138 As in so many other countries, the developments have originated within the 
transportation sector. The first, and up to now only, public private partnership in Finland 
regarding road infrastructure, was an upgrading of a 70 kilometre road section between 
Järvenpää and Lahti called the “Highway Four Project”. The project has been and still is 
considered as a great success. The use of the private finance technique advanced the 
implementation of the project with four to five years and shortened the construction time by 
one year.139 Hence the success has paved the way for further public private partnership and 
the government has issued an extensive programme for further public private partnerships in 
the transportation sector.140  
 
However, the step in right clauses have for these particular projects been contracted with the 
intention to spark of at an early stage, a technique that has been called “early warning”.141 The 
legal situation in Finland is equivalent to the Swedish. The bankruptcy Act contains no 
regulations regarding the estate’s entitlement to demand performance of the debtor’s 
agreement hence, legal uncertainty prevails. The Reorganisation Act on the other hand 
                                                
138 Pekka Lehtinen, Scandinavia: Public private partnerships for the development of infrastructure in Finland, 
published on the webpage www.chambersandpartners.com. 
139 See http://www.nelostie.net/ and Näringsdepartementet, ALTERNATIV FINANSIERING GENOM 
PARTNERSKAP, Stockholm (DS 2000:65), 2000, p. 36. 
140 Näringsdepartmentet, ALTERNATIV FINANSIERING GENOM PARTNERSKAP, Stockholm (DS 
2000:65), 2000, p. 36. 
141 Intervju Lisa Almen, EIB. 
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prescribes such right, in accordance with the Swedish rules.142 Albeit Finland seems to have 
embraced the concept of public private partnerships, the government has not yet gone as far as 
in Norway, where a legislative reform have been implemented considering the bankrupt 
estate’s right to accede to the debtor’s contracts, as described previously. As in Sweden the 
general rules are nonetheless subjected to investigation.143 
7.5.2 Risk for early cancellation 
However, beyond the difficulties and extended negotiation induced in the early warning 
technique, such method give incitements for the lenders to exercise their step in rights before 
the project company has been given a proper chance to survive. The direct agreements 
contracted with regard to the E-18 project, entitles the lenders to exercise their step in rights 
even prior to the solvent party according to contracted terms is entitled to cancel, before the 
time for the project company to cure its default has expired.144 Nevertheless a step in from the 
lenders proves to be a better solution than entitling the liquidator to complete the project, such 
entry is nevertheless connected to a number of risk and thus a threat for the due performance 
of the project. Besides in this regard, cancellation of the project contract is equivalent to 
insolvency for the project company since this is the sole source of income.  
 
Apparently, mandatory rules and legal uncertainty considering the right of the bankrupt estate 
to compel performance of contracts, tends to result in techniques that counteract the 
objectives of company rehabilitation as well as bankruptcy. 
 
Håstad supports this argumentation. He highlights the risk for the solvent party to cancel prior 
to the bankruptcy as soon as suspicion of the debtor’s solvency appears, in order to get 
protection from the onerous outcome of an insolvency proceeding where the estate chooses to 
entry.145 With regard to project finance such risk appears to be crucial and hence a balancing 
of interest may even from a “bankruptcy” perspective bring about exception from the general 
principle.  
 
Besides it should be stressed that the early warning system may be subjected to the 36 § of the 
Swedish Law of Contracts. It may be considered as unreasonable to entitle the lenders to step 
                                                
142 ”Företagssaneringslagen” The Reorganisation Act, § 27 3 st. correspond to FRekL 2:20 §. 
143 See SOU 2001:80 p. 117 ff. 
144 Intervju Lisa Almén, EIB. 
145 Håstad, Sakrätt, p. 402. 
 LEGAL#1568914v2 
in at such an early stage that the project company has not been given reasonable time to 
perform on its own.  
 
8. Conclusion 
It appears that the two perspectives deliberated in doctrine, the solvent party as opposes to the 
bankrupt estate and its creditors prove inadequate pertaining to project finance. There is 
considerably more interest to take into account that renders the traditional argumentation 
invoked in legal literature inapplicable for the particular circumstances at stake in project 
finance. The concept of “all creditors” must be modulated. The interest of protection 
noticeably varies among different creditors and hence there are reasons to give preference for 
the syndicated lenders who comprise the major part of the creditors and those subjected to the 
major risks.  
 
None of the risks that hold to be likely in legal literature or key arguments invoked in favour 
of the bankruptcy perspective is pertinent considering project finance where the lenders have 
step in rights. There are incitements to consider other creditors in the contracting of the 
solvent party and the debtor prior to the bankruptcy. The solvent party does incur an 
inconsiderable further damage or inconvenience beyond what he would have suffered if the 
contracts instead had been cancelled on the day of the bankruptcy judgement. Besides this 
inconvenience is not a matter of concern solely for the single contracting party however 
encompasses the public interest of infrastructure and the quality of such. Besides the lender’s 
step in comprise a substitute providing a noticeably better solution.  The most efficient and 
favourable solution for “all creditors” will be achieved by entitling the lender’s and hence not 
the estate to enter into the project company’s contracts, particularly the project agreement. It 
may certainly be questioned why the estate should be considered as a “new third party” not 
possible to include in direct agreements prior to a bankruptcy, when all major creditors 
participate in such agreement.  
 
However, de lege lata as well as de lege ferenda remain uncertain. The principal rule de lege 
lata give preference to the right of entry for the estate in analogy with the 63 § SAG. Albeit 
exceptions can be made in analogy with anticipatory breach such deviations from the basic 
principle is subjected to inconveniences. The debate de lege ferenda indicates a highly trend 
towards company reorganisation and increased priority of secured creditors.  
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The objectives behind the new insolvency rules and the essence of the debate of incorporating 
the two insolvency proceedings are considerably more likely to be achieved if the lender’s are 
entitled to enter into the debtor’s contract. The commission advocates flexibility and the 
importance of giving all the creditors incentives to participate. It can be questioned if the best 
way to achieve such goals is through mandatory rules is. Conversely, the principle of freedom 
of contract and encouraging private work out insensitive, as provided for in direct agreements, 
is without doubt a better solution for the particular circumstances in project finance.  
 
In conclusion, a balancing of interest, de lege lata, definitely points in favour of entitling the 
lender’s to step in and the solvent party to cancel and hence not entitling the estate to accede 
to the debtor’s contracts. However, uncertainty prevails. Besides, it is just a matter of time 
before a legal reform is brought into force, prescribing general rules in favour of the 
bankruptcy estate to enter. It is thus essential to carve out exceptions for project finance and 
public private partnership in such proposal. Against this background a law reform is here 
presented. 
 
9. Law reform 
9.1 Introduction to the proposal 
The point of departure for a law reform is thus to carve out exceptions from the principal rule 
of the bankrupt estate’s right to enter into the debtor’s, hence the project company’s 
agreements in relation to the particular circumstances here examined. However, there are a 
number of aspects requiring careful considerations.  
 
The focus of this essay is on large-scale public infrastructure projects where the public 
somehow comprises a client and counterparty to a project company. The essay refers to 
construction projects within the transport sector to a significant extent and particular attention 
is paid to the financing model used for the construction of motorways in Norway. However, 
private public partnership can be used in a number of different sectors. Besides, the 
circumstances here examined are equivalent to those relating to project financing in general, 
without the client necessarily to be the public. Apparently there are certain aspects that require 
further examination. Should the exception apply to public private projects or be extended to 
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encompass project finance in general where the client is a private entity? What financing 
techniques should be acknowledged, what is a project company and how should the estate’s 
right of entry be correlated to the financers step in rights. The most fundamental task for a law 
reform is thus to consider such aspects and to make adequate demarcates and definitions. The 
proposal here presented is designed against the background of the balancing of interest 
accomplished above, however in order to make the law proposal efficient, certain interests is 
subjected to further evaluation as well.  
 
The enquiry here to be examined is thus what projects and financial techniques the exception 
shall be extended to encompass, and what legal technique that should be used in order to 
devise such law proposal. Before these considerations are examined further, the wording of 
the exception for PPP in Norway is briefly presented. 
9.2 The law reform in Norway 
The legislative change in Norway is brought about as a section in the individual “Road Act” 
“Veglova chapter 4.146 This chapter deliberates the economical responsibility, designing, 
construction and maintenance of public roads. The exception is very brief and stipulates: 
 
Paragrafen her gjeld avtalar mellom vedkomande vegstyremakt og det selskapet som 
skal finansiere og stå for utbygging av ein offentleg veg, og stå for drift og vedlikehald 
av vegen i minst ti år etter at han er opna for trafikk. 
 
Paragrafen gjeld berre dersom det følgjer av avtalen at minst halvparten av selskapet sitt 
vederlag skal betalast etter at vegen er opna for trafikk, og at dette vederlaget skal 
betalast i samsvar med avtalen fram til selskapet si plikt til å drifte og vedlikehalde 
vegen tek slutt. 
 
Om det vert opna konkurs i selskapet sitt bu, har konkursbuet ikkje rett til å tre inn i ein 
avtale som nemnt i paragrafen her.147 
 
                                                
146 lov 21. juni 1963 nr. 23 (veglova). 
147 Ny § 21 i lov 21. juni 1963 nr. 23 (veglova). 
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9.3. The scope of projects and financial techniques  
The exception in the Norwegian law provision appears to provide poor guidance for what 
projects and legal techniques the exception, as far as Sweden concerns, should be extended to. 
Hence it is prescribed in the individual Road Act and solely applies to PPP concerning road 
projects. The exception is very restricted in a number of aspects, it solely encompasses public 
roads where the counterparty, the client, to a project company is related to the road 
department or the local authorities. Besides it is adjusted for the particular financing 
techniques that have been used for the PPP projects accomplished in Norway. There is a 
requirement for the payments from the public counterparty to be received subsequent to the 
accomplishment of the project and there is even a limit of half the compensation sum to be 
paid subsequent to the road has been opened for traffic and for the payments to sustain until 
the end of the contracting period.148  
9.3.1 Starting point 
The starting point for the proposal here presented emanates from the balancing of interest 
accomplished above. In fact, the matter of decisive significance is where the interest of the 
senior lenders can be said to prevail over the interest of the other creditors. As long as this 
precondition is upheld there is no motive or interest speaking in favour of entitling the 
bankrupt estate to enter into the project company’s contractual relationships and prevent the 
lenders from exercising their step in rights. This conclusion can besides be made against the 
background that the lender’s step in rights increases the chances for the project to survive and 
hence can generally be said to be at advantage for the major creditors, save for the project 
sponsors.  
 
So, in what situations can the interest of the lenders be said to prevail? The basic 
preconditions for the balancing of interest can in brief be summarised to where the financiers 
are exposed to a non- or limited recourse finance, hence where the borrower is a vehicle 
company and the assets of the project is limited and the repayments and interests payments of 
the loans are depended on the project’s future revenues and the calculated cash flow. The 
project should also include step in rights. Besides, the balancing of interest encompasses 
projects where some kind of public interest can be distinguished and may be described as 
infrastructure projects in a broad sense. Apparently, the suggestion made here is to carve out a 
                                                
148 Vedlegg 20120, section 6. 
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general exception on the basis of a balancing of interest. However, the precise meaning of 
such balancing of interests and the legal technique that should be used in order to construct a 
law proposal must be deliberated closer.  
9.3.2 Public private partnership or project finance in general 
The defining of the scope of project encompasses the enquiry whether exceptions should be 
acknowledge solely where the client or counterparty is represented by the public or in relation 
to project finance in general. The essay predominantly deliberates the concept of private 
public partnership and hence where the public is the counterparty to a project company. 
However, the balancing of interest is pertinent with regard to project finance in general 
without the client necessarily to be the public. 
 
The lenders are subjected to equivalent high-risk exposure (depending on the contracted 
terms) with regard to a private gas project for instance, where the repayment of the loan is 
depended on the project’s future revenues and the cash flow and hence the key objective in 
order to make the project bankable is to preserve the cash flow. Whether or not the sum 
payable is to be obtained from a public counterparty does not accurately change the lenders 
situation. Besides, the public interest in such projects may be as pertinent as regards projects 
where the client is de facto the public. The factual meaning of public can also be questioned, 
should it be restricted to a public body, as in the Norwegian exception, or extended to public 
companies such as “Vattenfall” for instance? It appears that the borderline to a pure private 
company is not far away and there is no real interest for a legislative exception to draw such 
line. Such border could besides cause undesired and inequitable competitive disadvantages. 
Apparently, as long as there is some kind of public interest in the project that is to be 
constructed there are no reasons to restrict the exception to solely public private partnerships 
but to project finance in general where the interest of the lenders prevail over the interest of 
the other creditors. However, general competitive consequences, predominantly in the view of 
European Law, are nevertheless here recommended to be subject to further scrutiny. 
 
However, the quandaries here examined are highly controversial and political and it is thus 
problematic to suggest an unbiased law proposal. Besides, it may appear controversial to 
suggest a general applicable exception for project finance in a broad sense, where the Swedish 
government has been reluctant to even admit financing through public private partnerships. 
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Albeit the quandary of involving the private sector in public services as a means of financing 
infrastructure projects is in contention, the question here examined is less divisive. 
   
The current legal situation, de lege lata, as well as de lege ferenda, is most likely to 
acknowledge exceptions in relation to construction contracts in general. The public 
investigation presented so far, proposes that the basic provision shall not apply with regard to 
construction contracts.149 It is thus unlikely for an exception relating to project financing in 
general, to appear controversial.  
 
Against the background presented previously, the public interest of infrastructure and the high 
risk-exposure subjected to such large-scale projects appear to outweigh any objections that 
may encumber the efficiency of the financiers’ step-in rights and the contracting parties’ 
ability to cancel. With some reservations it is thus here recommended for the exception to be 
extended to larger project financing as well.   
9.3.3 The scope of public private partnerships 
The term public private partnership is very broad in several aspects. It can be used in a 
number of different sectors such as transportation, energy, waste management, housing, 
education and healthcare and encompass small as well as large-scale projects. Besides, it 
encompasses a whole range of arrangements where the magnitude of the private sector 
involvement varies. Public private partnership approaches can be arrayed across a spectrum, 
where at one end the public sector retains all responsibility for financing, constructing, 
operating and maintaining the project assets, as well as assuming all risks that are associated 
with the project; whereas at the other end, the private sector assumes all these responsibilities 
and risks.150Apparently, the concept is applicable even in cases not including a real financing, 
(where the public is responsible for this part).  
 
Albeit financing through public private partnership so far is not used to a large extent in 
Sweden, several areas of public services are today performed by the private sector such as 
educational, nursing, and transportation sectors. (Up till now there has only been one 
infrastructure project that has been financed through a public private partnership, the so called 
                                                
149 SOU 2001:80 p. 221-222. 
150 Economic Commission, Guidelines, 2002, p. 13-14. 
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“Arlandabanan”.151) This is also a form of private public partnership, so called contracting out 
and management contracts, where the public sector simply enters into service and 
management contracts with the private sector.152 However this is not the form of partnership 
primarily referred to here.  
 
The first and somehow obvious criteria for the interest of the senior lenders to prevail in 
accordance with the balancing of interest above, is for the partnership arrangement to include 
a financing. Contractual arrangements solely encompasses the maintenance of a public facility 
is thus outside the scope of this essay. However, it is another question whether the bankruptcy 
occurs during the maintenance period. The matter of decisive importance for the exception to 
apply is here suggested to be as long as the repayments and the interest payments yet not have 
fall due.  
 
Whether the project concerns roads, gas or healthcare is off less importance for the purpose of 
this essay as well, nevertheless, the meaning of “public interest” must be closer defined, 
whish is made below. Apparently, a law proposal can be extended to a number of sectors 
however the focus for this essay is on large-scale capital-intensive infrastructure projects. 
Accordingly, against the background presented above, the arguments invoked opposing the 
right of the estate to accede to the debtor’s contracts, primarily attach to high risk-exposure 
infrastructure projects such as motorways, railroads, bridges, water supply and energy 
facilities. However, save for some restrictions, there are no accurate reasons to restrict the 
application of the exceptions to solely such large-scale projects.  
 
The financing techniques used (in project finance in general and) in public private 
partnerships varies to a large extent as well. The public private partnership form primarily 
referred to here is the technique used (and in use) in Norway for the construction of roads, the 
so called “build operate and transfer” technique (BOT). However, as far as Sweden concerns, 
whether and to what extent public infrastructure will be financed through private public 
partnership in the future, and what technique that may be used for this purpose, remain 
uncertain. If the legal opinion changes it is most likely for the partnership form to start within 
the transport sector as a form of BOT project. In fact there is already a Swedish model for 
public private partnership for large-scale infrastructure project within the motorway and 
                                                
151 See for instance Alternativ finansiering genom partnerskap, p. 40-41. 
152 European Commission, Guidelines, 2002, p. 21. 
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railroad sector, presented in conjunction with a report conducted in 1990 of the Ministry of 
Industry where the BOT model is suggested.153  
 
The application of the exceptions here presented is nevertheless somehow hypothetical. 
Besides, the techniques used in public private partnerships are subject to constant changes and 
improvements. A law provision prescribing exception must thus be flexible in order to 
encompass such factors. Furthermore, since it is here suggested for the exception to apply 
with regard to project finance in general it appears motivated to carve out a general worded 
exception narrowing down the basic precondition where the interest of the senior lenders can 
be said to prevail.    
9.3.4 Non- or limited recourse financing 
The interest of the lenders can be said to prevail where the financing is a non- recourse or at 
least a limited recourse financing. The general principle behind non-recourse financing is that 
the lenders have no recourse against the project sponsors and therefore only may take 
recourse to certain assets of the project company (or a joint venture of project sponsors) for 
the repayment of their loans and for interest payments on such loans.154  
 
Besides, as indicated previously, this factor is combined with the fact that the value of the 
assets that are held by the project company often are very uncertain. Under such non-recourse 
financing, the lenders therefore base their financing decisions almost solely on the projected 
future revenues from the project.155 Both the equity holders and the creditors therefore focus 
their attention on the prospective future revenues of the project company. The most common 
way to achieve a non-recourse structure is to have a sole-purpose project company as debtor 
and owner of the project facility. In such cases the creditors have no recourse against the 
project sponsors as long as there is no reason to lift the corporate veil.  
 
Under limited recourse financing structures, where the project sponsors have some, albeit 
very limited, responsibility for the project debt, the project can be owned directly by the 
                                                
153 A committee consisting of representatives from the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry, 
Employment and Communications was set up in the late 1990s in order to examine the pros and cons of using 
public private partnerships as an alternative method for financing of infrastructure projects. As part of its duty 
the committee carried out a legal review as well and found that the existing legal framework in Sweden allowed 
infrastructure projects to be established through public private partnerships. Näringsdepartmentet, Alternativ 
finansiering genom partnerskap, Stockholm (DS 2000:65), 2000. 
154 Vinter, Project Finance, 1996, p. 111. 
155 Merna & Cyrus, Financing and managing of infrastructure projects, p. 110.  
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project sponsors. In these situations the project sponsors are the debtors under the project 
debt, however, their responsibility is limited contractually through limited recourse 
contracts.156 The second situation that often gives rise to limited recourse situations is when 
project sponsors issue guarantees to the project creditors under what would otherwise be a 
non-recourse financing. The obligations contained in these guarantees are often limited to 
certain events and amounts, which limits the recourse against the project sponsors. 
 
Furthermore, the feature of the future revenues and hence the contractual arrangements for 
this purpose varies as well. The repayments and interest payments of the loans can, as for the 
Norwegian road projects, be subjected to so called “availability charge”. In simple terms this 
mean that the payments from the public counterparty are received as long as the road is 
opened up and available for traffic. The payments are thus not dependent on the number of 
cars that factually pass the shadow toll, hence the project company do not take any market 
risks. This is called contract-tied revenues and they are received from a public counter-party 
who uses the off-take or distributes it to the end users. These contract-tied revenues are 
received based on so called off-take agreements or take-or-pay agreements.  
 
The second category that project revenues can be divided into is market-led revenues. Market-
led revenues are from services or products that are sold directly to the customers. These 
revenues are therefore exposed to market risks, which includes changes in demand for the 
services or products that are produced through the project facility, increases in costs of raw 
materials and consumables, changes in macro-economic parameters (for instance recessions 
and down-turns in the economy). 157 The conclusion that can be drawn when comparing these 
two categories of revenues is that market revenues hold a much greater uncertainty than 
contract-tied revenues.158 
 
However, the interest of protection for the senior lenders can nevertheless be said to be 
comparable for these two categories of future revenues since low risk is compensated with 
cheaper costs for the lending. Appreciably, the interest rates where contract-tied revenues are 
contracted are not as high as for market-led revenues.  
                                                
156 It should however be noted that such limited recourse contracts often are technically unsatisfactory and may 
not be available in all jurisdictions, Wood, Project Finance, p. 23. 
157 Merna & Cyrus, Financing and managing of infrastructure projects, p. 84. 
158 The risks associated with market led revenues can, however, be reduced by way of public party guarantees 
that have the same purpose and similar effects as off-take agreements. Vinter, Project Finance, 1998, p. 159-172 
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As mentioned previously, the focus on future revenues has several important implications. 
Apart from structuring the contractual documentation in order to secure the future revenues 
(through various clauses and arrangements that reduce the risks that the future revenues are 
exposed to), it creates incentives for on-time and within-budget implementation of projects. 
Furthermore, it provides an incentive for the project sponsors to adopt a “life-cycle cost” 
approach through which future costs for the operation and maintenance of the project facility 
can be reduced and made more consistent and predictable.159 The savage consequences 
ensuing from an entry of the bankrupt estate must be appreciated against this background and 
can thus nevertheless be enough emphasised. 
9.3.4.1 Acquisition of the project and complicated financial arrangements 
Furthermore, it must be considered whether the exceptions should apply to lenders who lend 
money for the acquisition of a project. The exception should persuade the public interest of 
infrastructure and apply to risks subjected to (the construction and maintenance) of such 
projects and hence not apply to pure commercial capital speculative risks. This is here thus 
considered to be outside the objective of the exception.  
 
It should be noted that such restriction may prevent the exceptions from apply to complicated 
financial structures such as in a cross-collateral financing structure on a portfolio basis with 
many borrowers and projects. This technique is used for some of the more sophisticated 
borrowing base financing in the North Sea. In this type of financing, a group of companies 
obtain cheaper finance because a number of companies in the group give security over their 
project assets securing not just their own individual borrowings but also borrowings by their 
sister companies in the group.160 
 
However, such complicated financial structures is not apparent in Swedish projects and it is 
besides highly unlikely for the bankrupt estate to even think about enter into such complex 
project agreements. It is not the intention here to prescribe exceptions for commercial capital 
speculative purposes, thus these aspects are beyond the scope of this essay and not 
commented further. However in order to prevent undesired legal uncertainness it is here 
recommended to further consider whether the exception should apply to such arrangements. 
                                                
159 European Commission, Guidelines, 2002, p. 22. 
160 Vinter, Project Finance, unpublished version from the 9 December 2005, chapter 8 and 13. 
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9.4 Relation to the project company’s other contracting parties 
As indicated above, the lenders generally seek to step into all the project company’s contracts, 
occasionally as a form of cure period, and definitely with the intention to replace the old 
company where the survival of the project company appears to be without any prospects of 
success. Apparently, in order for the lender’s step in rights to be efficient, the debtor’s estate 
should not be entitled to enter into any of the project company’s agreements. Besides, if the 
lenders are not entitled to step into these contractual relationships and instead being forced to 
search for new contracting parties, the arguments invoked that the lender’s step in rights 
provide the better solution for the major creditors involved, are thus not apparent.  
 
The Norwegian law proves inadequate in this regard and does not comment upon other 
contractual relationship save for the public counterparty. The Explanatory Notes briefly 
mentions the negative outcome for the subcontractors and that the estate is generally entitled 
to enter into these contractual relationships as well.  
 
If the public party is entitled to cancel it is highly unlikely for the estate to enter into the 
project company’s other agreements, since it is predominantly the project contract that 
correspond to certain value. Apparently this is nevertheless generally solved in the individual 
cases, however, legal uncertainness is an undesired factor in this regard, that may threaten the 
due performance of the project and hence its cash flow. 
 
Albeit this is somehow outside the scope of this essay, hence the contractual relationship of 
the public party and the project company is primarily examined, the suggestion made here is 
for the exception to apply with regard to all of the project company’s agreements and not 
solely the key project contract.  
9.5 Correlation to step in rights 
Furthermore it is essential to regulate the correlation to the step in rights. The quandary is thus 
whether the public counterparty (and the other contracting parties) should be given a general 
right to cancel or whether the contracting parties solely should be entitled to such right where 
a project has step in rights and more important, solely where the step in rights de facto are 
exercised. The Norwegian law do not comment upon the correlation to the step in rights. It is 
not even a condition for the project to be subjected to step in rights. The new wording of the 
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English Insolvency and Companies Act, concerning the abolishment of the right to appoint an 
administrative receiver, refers to projects that have step-in rights, however, do not stipulate 
any requirements for such rights to be exercised. 
 
The situation is somehow different as regards the scenarios that are likely to apply in case of 
the project company’s bankruptcy. What happens if the lenders do not wish to exercise their 
step in rights or whether such attempt results in that the lenders step out again? The most 
convenient solution for all the creditors and the contracting parties in this regard, could even 
be to enable the bankrupt estate to step in. Albeit it is decided for a law proposal not to 
prescribe particular provisions in this regard, it is nevertheless necessary to consider such 
scenarios. It appears that the Norwegian law has not foreseen the consequences if the lenders 
do not whish to step in or perhaps even more important, subsequent to a step out, hence the 
wording can be criticised to be excessively brief.      
 
The suggestion made here is to open up for the estate to accede to the project company’s 
contracts where the lenders do not wish to step in, or subsequent to an entry, wish to step out. 
However, against the background presented above, the solvent public party is likely to 
encounter inconsiderably inconvenience ensuing from the estate’s right of entry and hence it 
is reasonable to provide the public party with the opportunity to choose. Nevertheless, this is 
somehow outside the scope of this essay, the most reasonable solution, and here presented, is 
that the estate should only be entitled to enter into the project company’s contracts if the 
public counterparty consents. 
 
Whether the other contracting parties should be entitled to prevent the estate from entry in 
these particular situations has not been deliberated in the balancing of interest above, however 
a proposal is nevertheless presented. The public interest can not be said to be as apparent as 
for the project contract entered into with the public, however given the unsecured creditors 
underprivileged position in the project company’s bankruptcy, there are certain reasons to 
protect these parties as well. The other contracting parties are noticeably likely to encounter 
inconsiderable damages if they where compelled to performance.  
 
Nevertheless, these scenarios are generally solved in the individual cases as well. Since the 
financiers in general base their decision to not step in or to step out, on the fact that the 
survival of the project company appears to be without any prospects of success, it is highly 
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unlikely that the bankrupt estate wishes to accede to the project company’s contracts in these 
particular situations. However, legal uncertainness is a matter of concern, delays and doubts 
increases the risks and hence the costs for the project. 
 
A law proposal should thus be upheld in order to endorse flexibility and for the parties to 
agree upon a common solution. However, if the parties can not agree, the most reasonable 
solution is to enable the other contracting parties with the opportunity to choose as well. This 
is also motivated by the fact that the law should seek to encourage private entities to 
participate in public private partnership projects without being exposed to inconsiderably 
risks. It is thus suggested here that the estate should only be entitled to compel performance of 
any contracting party to the project company, if the contracting party affected has consent. 
9.6 Legal technique  
Apparently, a law proposal must consider and acknowledge exceptions from the basic 
principle of the bankrupt estates right to accede to the debtor’s contract, in all the particular 
situations outlined previously. The basic criteria for a law provision is thus where the debtor 
is a project company, or a joint venture of project sponsors or where the project sponsors are 
the debtors under the project debt with limited responsibility through limited recourse 
contracts. Besides, the asset of the project company should be limited. The exception shall 
encompass both market led and contract-tied future revenues. 
 
There are various kinds of legal techniques that can be used in the pursuit of narrowing down 
all these criterions. The primarily matter of concern is somehow technical and deliberates 
where the exceptions should be prescribed.   
9.6.1 Exceptions in individual acts or in the bankruptcy act 
Given that a general legislative reform is underway a law proposal must be designed in order 
to remain efficient even subsequent to such law reform, or to be incorporated in conjunction 
herewith. The formulation of a coming law proposal prescribing general rules of the bankrupt 
estate’s right of entry and the proposal of merging the two insolvency proceedings is thus 
uncertain. However most likely, in accordance with the public report (SOU 2001:80), is for 
general rules to be prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act or in an integrated Insolvency Act. The 
provisions are to be subordinated to any other act. However in keeping with the pattern in 
Denmark and Norway exceptions is held to be carved out within the section, where the nature 
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of the legal relationship otherwise require. In general the exceptions are held to be where the 
debtor’s person is significant for the due performance of the agreement.161 
 
Apparently, exceptions from the provisions regarding accession by the bankrupt’s estate, with 
regard to the particular purpose for this essay, can be prescribed in individual acts or as an 
exception directly spelled out in the general provisions in the Insolvency Act.  
 
Furthermore, it is likely for legislative changes to be brought into force ensuing from an 
increased willingness to make use of the partnership financing technique. However it appears 
that no extended legal amendments are required in order to carry out infrastructure projects 
through public private partnerships albeit several legal challenges (as the purpose for this 
essay) are likely to be solved. The primarily concern in this regard is to what extent public 
services can be delegated to the private sector. Swedish law contains rules and regulations that 
stipulate that certain services must be delivered by the public sector and particular activities 
must be performed by public authorities. This is, for instance, regularly the case for activities 
that in one way or the other comprise the exercise of public authority.162  
 
The wording of the Norwegian law is dependent on the current wording of the Road Act. In 
order for a law proposal to be efficient it should be flexible and thus easily be subject to 
amendments in case of the private public partnership technique expands to areas beyond the 
sectors here examined.  
 
The legal technique suggested here in order to achieve the outlined objectives is to carve out 
general worded exceptions, not reliant on the wording of applicable laws, and likely to apply 
to various forms of infrastructure projects. Unlike the Norwegian provision, the exceptions is 
here recommended to be prescribed in a supplementary section to the general provisions 
governing the bankrupt’s estate’s accession to the debtor’s agreements, directly in the 
Insolvency Act. Whether further exceptions for other sectors of private public partnership 
projects are desired, such exceptions can be placed here as well. By avoiding regulations in 
individual acts, legal certainness and clarity can be upheld as well. Besides, this is motivated 
by the fact that there are no individual acts for all kinds of infrastructure projects likely to be 
concerned, where exceptions can be carved out.  
                                                
161 SOU 2001:80 p. 219-222. 
162 Näringsdepartmentet, Alternativ finansiering genom partnerskap, Stockholm (DS 2000:65), 2000. 
 LEGAL#1568914v2 
9.6.2 Guidance from exceptions in English law 
Albeit the exception is to be general applicable and prescribed in the bankruptcy act, the 
provision could nevertheless be narrowly defined. The law provision in Norway as well as the 
English exceptions from the abolishment of the right to appoint an administrative receiver is 
depended on certain criterions as laws generally are.  
 
Albeit the Norwegian proposal appears to be without useful help, significant guidance can be 
provided from the changes in the insolvency legislation in England, where a list of exceptions 
has been acknowledged in the Insolvency Act. Exceptions pertinent for this purpose can be 
summarised to public-private partnership projects, utility projects and larger project 
financing.163 The exception relating to capital market arrangements is of possible interest to 
project financers as well because it is drafted widely and it may present structuring 
opportunities for projects which would not for various reasons fall within one of the specific 
project finance exceptions.164  
 
The provisions are simply composed by a number of “technical” requirements that are to be 
met in order for the exceptions to apply. These requirements are defined below the main 
provisions. 
 
The exceptions distinguish between PPP and project finance in general. The exception 
prescribed in the English Insolvency Act relating to larger project financings provides that the 
right to appoint an administrative receiver has not been abolished in relation to a project 
company of a project whish is a financed project. A project is held to be financed if “under an 
agreement relating to the project a project company incurs, or when an agreement is entered 
into is expected to incur, a debt of at least £50 million for the purpose of carrying out the 
project.165 
 
However, this wording has been subjected to scrutiny in a recent case, Feetum v. Levy. The 
judge, Lewison J considered the meaning of the phrase “expected to incur” and stated that: “it 
seems to me that there is something more than merely a hope involved in an exception. An 
exception connotes at least some likelihood of that which is expected coming to pass.” He 
                                                
163 ss.72B – 72GA of the IA 1986. 
164 S. 72 B of the IA 1986. 
165 s. 72D(1) of the IA 1986. 
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further held that there was no expectation that the company in question would borrow at least 
£50 million. Even though it might be said that the highest the company expected to borrow 
was up to £65 million, there was de facto no evidence that the level of borrowing was likely to 
be achieved and “up to is not the same as at least”. 
 
As demonstrated in English case law, there is an infinite risk induced in such “technical” law 
technique. Where the matter of decisive importance is connected to certain definitions that 
focus on minimum sums etc, the legal judgement tends to turn away from the factual 
objective and the circumstances that are of essential importance. It can thus be questioned 
whether definitions should encompass minimum amount of the debt and such technical 
criterions at all. Besides, in view of the fact that the exception should be applicable to various 
forms of financing and contractual techniques, and to project finance in general, there is no 
reason to bind the exception to a particular model or definition. 
 
As far as the exception under Swedish law concern, there are nevertheless no reasons to 
restrict the exceptions to such high sums as £50 million. It must be kept in mind that the 
English exceptions are related to a considerably far extended remedy than the Swedish 
quandary of the estate’s right to accede to the debtor’s contracts, nevertheless the outcome of 
the two remedies appears to coincide for these particular cases (where the survival of the 
company is depended on a single contract). 
 
The objective here is thus that the provision and the exception shall apply where the interest 
of the senior lender’s can be said to prevail. The best way to achieve this is thus for the law 
provision to compel the judge to conduct a balancing of interest himself. Instead of focusing 
on technical criterions it is here suggested that the wording of the law should require the judge 
to base his decision on a balancing of interest. The decisive factors should thus not primarily 
be subjected to certain definitions but to a factual balancing of interest. In this way, 
consideration to the importance of openness as mentioned previously, can be met and hence 
the superiority of the principle of freedom of contracts is unlikely to outweigh other interest.  
9.6.3 Presumption 
The question is thus how this balancing of interest should be conducted. Naturally, the 
wording of the exception can be broadly defined and leave out for the judge to make a 
balancing of interest, utterly on his own, in each individual situation. However, such broad 
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judgement is unpredictable and may result in legal uncertainty. It is here suggested for the 
exception to carve out the typical situation where the interest of the senior lenders in general 
can be considered to prevail. Possibly, the provision may acknowledge the interest of the 
other junior lenders or creditors to prevail in exceptionally situations after a legal judgement 
in the individual case. However the law provision should stress that such exception (from the 
exception of the right of the estate to entry) should be applied restrictively, solely in extreme 
exceptionally cases. The legal technique suggested is thus for the law provision to lay down a 
presumption however pointing out that a balancing of interest is the factor of deceive 
importance. 
 
Albeit, the intention here is to avoid definitions as far as possible, a number of criterions are 
nevertheless necessary if the law provision is to lay down a presumption. It is essential for a 
general applicable exception to prescribe well-weighted definitions and demarcates. Vinter 
criticises the English project finance exceptions to suffer from a curious lack of clarity and 
precision. He provides two examples in this regard; whether the exceptions apply to 
refinancing and if a simple real estate development is capable of benefiting from the financed 
project exceptions and be incorporated in the word “project”.166 In fact the exceptions in the 
English insolvency and company laws provide extensive definitions of phrases like public-
private partnership project, utility project, project company and related terms but nowhere in 
the new legislation is the word project itself defined. The consequences of such imprecise 
wording have been demonstrated in the same English case referred to previously. In Feetum v. 
Levy167 it was acknowledged that project was not defined in the law provision and the judge 
saw no reasons to apply a particular limited meaning to it. It was accordingly held that a 
scheme to install advertising video screens in taxicabs was a project for the purpose of the 
relevant provisions of the Insolvency Act.168  
 
Noticeably this judgement confirm the importance for a law provision to oblige the judge to 
base his decision in line with the intended objective of a certain law provision however the 
importance of a law provision to express and define its objective is nevertheless 
demonstrated.  
                                                
166 Vinter, Project Finance, so far unpublished version from the 9 December 2005, chapter 8 s.3(e). 
167 Case No: HC04 C0393. 
168 Case No: HC04 C0393, The Times 24th January, 2005. 
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9.6.4 Proposal 
The general requirement suggested here, in accordance with the balancing of interest above, is 
to acknowledge exceptions where the debtor has attained a non resource or a limited recourse 
financing for the purpose of carrying out a project and the repayments and the interest 
payments of the debt is depended on the project’s future revenues and cash flow. Since it is 
suggested here for pure capital speculative purposes to be outside the scope of this essay, the 
formulation “for the purpose of carrying out the project” is upheld, hence indicating that the 
exceptions should not apply to lenders who lend money for the acquisition of a project. 
 
The provision shall thus prescribe that the interest of the senior lenders (to exercise their step 
in rights) prevails over any interest of the junior lenders or the other creditors to the debtor in 
these particular situations. It order for the “public interest” to be considered, the word project 
shall be included in this first section and closer defined underneath it, beside the term is to be 
italicized (underlined) in order to signify its intended particular meaning in accordance with 
the definition below. The intent is for the requirements prescribed in this first section to be 
satisfied in every case and hence the public interest is a general prerequisite for the exception 
to apply however without render the application too restricted. (The wording of the definition 
is prescribed below.) 
 
The next section is here suggested to exemplify when a non recourse or limited recourse 
financing generally can be said to be attained, hence where the debtor is a project company, in 
relation to a project with limited recourses and whish includes step-in rights. The intent is for 
the italicized (underlined) terms to be defined underneath as well (whish is made here below).  
 
Finally, a section shall carve out the exception that entitles the estate to enter into the debtor’s 
agreement where the interest of the other creditors, for some exceptionally particular reason, 
can be said to outweigh the interest of the senior lenders. 
9.6.5 Definitions 
The suggestion made here is thus for the law provision to define the words “project”, “project 
company” and “step in rights”. 
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9.6.5.1 Definition of project 
Since the English law provisions referred to previously do not define the word project, 
guidance can not be obtained from here. However, the intention behind the exceptions 
approved provides adequate help in this regard. Since the key objective is for the exception to 
apply in cases where the interest of protection for the lenders can be said to prevail, the term 
should not be narrowly defined. The objective here is thus for the exception to be generally 
applicable. 
 
As indicated previously, public private partnership can be used in a number of sectors. It has 
already been indicated that the matter of decisive importance should not be whether the 
project concern nursing or transport project as long as the projects encompasses a financing 
and a broad public interest can be distinguished. Besides, no accurate reasons to restrict the 
application of the exceptions to solely large-scale projects have been demonstrated. 
 
A broadly definition of infrastructure is thus here suggested, (partly as a means to encourage 
the private public partnership technique in Sweden). As far as the public interest of 
infrastructure is met certain limitation of the debt amount proves unnecessary and is likely to 
turn the attention of the scrutiny away from the public purpose and other essential factors. 
Besides, unlike the English law provisions, there are no reasons to define or use the term 
public private partnership, since one general exception here is suggested to incorporate both 
public private partnership financings and project finance in general.  
 
The proposal presented here is in line with the intent behind the exceptions relating to project 
finance approved in English law. A project is to be distinguished from a commercial 
enterprise and the term project should be limited to investment in public or strategic buildings 
or infrastructure, including the energy and telecommunications sectors, and should not 
encompass purely private ventures which do not fall within the foregoing.169 This wording is 
thus further elucidated when the exception is read as an entity and in conjunction with the 
other definitions.  
 
However it is recommended for this as well as for all definitions here presented, to be 
subjected to scrutiny and to be amended and extended along with a possible development of 
                                                
169 Graham Vinter, Project Finance, chapter 8, so far unpublished version from the 9 December 2005.  
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the financing technique and PPP models used. The English definition of public private 
partnership is besides worth mention in case it is desired for the application of the exceptions 
to be extended in the future: 
 
A public-private partnership project is a project: 
“(a) the recourses for whish are provided by one or more public bodies and partly by one or 
more private persons, or  
(b) which is designed wholly or mainly for the purpose of assisting a public body discharge a 
function.” 170 
9.6.5.2 Definition of project company 
The Norwegian law do not use the wording public private partnership (Offentligt Privat 
Samarbete, OPS) and it is pointed out in the explanatory notes that the term entity 
(“selskapet”) is used in order for the exception to be applied broadly and encompass various 
forms of associations.171 It is essential for the meaning of “project company” not to be 
narrowly defined since there are various forms of associations and entities likely to participate 
in a public private partnership and in project finance in general. The exception is thus to be 
applicable in the cases where a limited recourse financing is attained as well, where the 
project sponsors are the debtor and where the joint venture form is used etc. The provision 
must thus clarify that the term project company shall not be restricted to a particular 
association form or even restricted to any association at all but to various forms of entities.  
 
However in order for the “public purpose” to prevail and not to encourage commercial 
speculative purposes it is here suggested for the definition of project company to relate to the 
purpose or the accomplishment of the project. The wording of the Norwegian law suffers 
from such provisions.  
 
Essential guidance can be provided from the English provisions here as well. Against the 
background of the balancing of interest presented above, the exception should apply to project 
companies that have the sole or principal responsibility under an agreement for carrying out 
all or part of the project. This is predominantly pertinent where the project company is 
granted a public concession agreement. However, in order for the general project finance 
                                                
170 S. 72C(2), see as well (1) of the IA 1986 
171 Vedlegg 20120, p 10 
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exception to be applicable and for more complicated financial structures to be approved, the 
definition must be extended further. A company carrying out a power project in Sweden 
cannot be said to have any responsibility under any agreement to carry out the project, but it 
will receive no revenues if it does not.172 
 
The English draftsmen have clearly accepted that many projects are carried out and financed 
through fairly complex corporate structures involving a number of sole purpose companies 
and it is held that in order to give effect to the spirit of the exceptions for project finance, it 
must still be possible to appoint an administrative receiver over each of those companies.  
Finance vehicles and property-owning companies are therefore included within the definition 
and there is an acceptance that a company can be a project company simply if it can be said to 
carry out the project together with a number of other companies.173 Holding companies are 
also included. This is important with regard to the appointment of an administrative receiver, 
because such appointment over the main project company (i.e. the company with the project’s 
assets and main contracts) is undesirable because it may, for example, cause essential 
consents and licences to be terminated. This is pertinent in this regard is well.174  
 
There is a requirement in the English provision that companies cannot carry out unrelated 
functions if they are to qualify as project companies, whish is suggested to apply in the 
proposal here presented as well.175 It should be noted that the requirement in relation to 
unrelated functions also applies to holding companies.  It is therefore submitted that a holding 
company which holds shares in a project company but also in another company which is not a 
project company will not itself be a project company.  This is a means to ensure that the 
holding company only holds shares in companies which are project companies for the project 
in question. 
 
Furthermore, it is here suggested to be prescribed in the Explanatory Notes, however not 
necessarily regulated directly in the wording of the law, whether, in relation to the unrelated 
function test, a company will take itself outside the project finance exceptions if, subsequent 
to its lenders advancing funds, it undertakes an unrelated function (possibly in breach of an 
undertaking in its finance documents not to do so). It is submitted that the result should 
                                                
172 The example is provided from Vinter, unpublished, chapter 8 section (f) 
173 in paragraph (c) 
174 Para 7(1) of Schedule 2A to the IA 1986, see as well Vinter, unpublished, 2005, chapter 8 section (f) 
175 Para 7(2) of Schedule 2A to the IA 1986 
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depend on whether the lenders took an undertaking from the company not to carry out 
unrelated functions and on whether, if they did, they took no action upon becoming aware of a 
breach.  If the lenders did not take such an undertaking (or if they knowingly acquiesced in a 
breach) a court could legitimately hold that they took the risk of the company carrying out 
unrelated functions and no longer being a project company as a result. Otherwise, a court 
should not fundamentally alter the nature of the lenders' rights simply because of action taken 
by their borrower in breach of covenant.176 
9.6.5.3 Definition of step-in rights 
The definition of step in rights in the English provisions refers to where a person who 
provides finance in connection with the project has a conditional entitlement under an 
agreement to assume responsibility for carrying out all or part of the project or making 
arrangements for carrying out all or part of the project. The inclusion of the last section is 
made for the same reasons as previously mentioned (considering the definition of roject 
company), because the reference to responsibility under an agreement, is not appropriate for a 
number of other more general projects (such as power projects). This definition corresponds 
to the balancing of interest made above and hence is suggested to apply in the proposal 
presented here as well.  
 
It remains somewhat curious that the draftsmen think that step-in rights are the touchstone of 
whether or not an administrative receiver can still be appointed in relation to a project in 
England. The typical way to step into an English company is to appoint an administrative 
receiver over it.  As a result, the legislation almost achieves the rather odd and circular result 
of stating that lenders may appoint an administrative receiver over a company involved in a 
project if they have reserved themselves the right to appoint an administrative receiver. 
Indeed, in Feetum v. Levy the judge held that the mere fact that a lender could appoint a 
receiver was not sufficient to enable a lender to have step-in rights for the purposes of the 
project finance exceptions.177 
 
However as far as jurisdictions with no receivership remedy concerns, like Sweden, these 
judgements provide poor guidance. However, the same circular result is apparent here as well 
since the basic question examined for the purpose of this essay is the efficiency of direct 
                                                
176 This reflection is made by Vinter in, Vinter, unpublished, 2005, chapter 8 section 
177 Case No: HC04 C0393, The Times 24th January, 2005, Vinter, unpublished 2005, chapter 8 seftion (f) 
 LEGAL#1568914v2 
agreements and step in rights under Swedish law. However, against the background of the 
balancing of interest above, the requirement for the project to include step-in rights is 
essential.  
9.7 Law proposal 
The law proposal is as follows: 
 
The interest of the senior lenders to exercise their step in rights shall prevail over any interest 
of the junior lenders or the other creditors to the debtor, and consequently the bankrupt estate 
shall not be entitled to enter into the debtor’s contractual agreements and compel 
performance;  
 
where the debtor has attained a non resource or a limited recourse financing for the purpose of 
carrying out a project and the repayments and the interest payments of the debt is depended 
on the project’s future revenues and cash flow 
 
A non recourse or limited recourse financing is generally attained where the debtor is a 
project company, in relation to a project, with limited recourses, and whish includes step-in 
rights. 
 
The interest of the other creditors may in extreme exceptionally cases be considered to 
outweigh the interest of the senior lenders, this fourth section shall apply restrictively. 
 
These provisions shall not apply if the senior lenders consent to entitle the estate to enter. 
Where the senior lenders declare that they do not wish to exercise their step-in rights, or 
where they, subsequent to a step in, declare that they wish to step out, the parties shall seek to 
agree upon a common solution. If such common solution is not achieved, the bankrupt’s 
estate is only entitled to compel performance if the contracting parties consent. 
 
A project: 
 
is to be distinguished from a commercial enterprise and the term project should 
be limited to investment in public or strategic (buildings or) infrastructure, 
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including the energy and telecommunications sectors, and should not 
encompass purely private ventures which do not fall within the foregoing 
 
A company is a project company of a project if: 
 
(a)  it holds property for the purpose of the project, 
(b)  it has sole or principal responsibility under an agreement for carrying out all or 
part of the project, 
(c) it is one of a number of companies which together carry out the project, 
(d)  it has the purpose of supplying finance to enable the project to be carried out, or 
(e)  it is the holding company of a company within any of paragraphs (a) to (d). 
 
The term company shall not be restricted to certain form of association and encompasses all 
kind of entities constructed for the purposes above. This provision shall also apply where the 
project sponsors are the debtor but have attained limited responsibility contractually through 
limited recourse contracts. 
 
A project has step-in rights: 
 
if a person who provides finance in connection with the project has a 
conditional entitlement under an agreement to – 
 
(a) assume sole or principal responsibility under an agreement for carrying out all 
or part of the project, or 
(b) make arrangements for carrying out all or part of the project. 
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